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Abstract
The thesis consists of three chapters. The rst one ("International Convergence and Local
Divergence") and the third one ("Trade and Migration: a U-shaped Transition in Eastern
Europe") are economic-geography models that study the relation between international trade
openness and the location of productive factors, with the subsequent implications for welfare and
convergence. The second chapter ("Skill-Upgrading and the Saving of Immigrants") develops a
dynamic model of saving and human-capital accumulation with two types of skills in order to
explain how unskilled migration may increase the amount of funds devoted to nancing higher
education among natives.
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Title: Associate Professor
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Chapter 1
International Convergence and Local
Divergence
Summary 1 This paper presents an East-West endogenous-growth model that reproduces re-
cent stylized facts applicable to the trade liberalization process of many developing countries:
convergence with the rest of the world, higher internal divergence, increasing spatial concen-
tration of economic activity and higher growth rates. We claim that the ongoing reduction of
manufacturing trade costs may generate a net inow of global demand towards the industrial-
ized cores of developing countries. This will induce a reallocation of labor from traditional to
modern sectors. In turn, such a sectoral shift may enlarge the catch-up (imitation) potential of
developing countries and raise global growth rates, due to Grossman and Helpmans complemen-
tarity between imitative and innovative activities. Although advanced economies may become
relatively worse o¤, the e¤ect on growth rates may allow them to gain in absolute terms.
1.1 Introduction
Chinas gradual liberalization over the last decades is leading to a rapid process of catchup with
more advanced economies. However, internal divergence has been rising, with the coastal areas
benetting much more than the more inland provinces. This experience has not been limited
to China. Though growth in Mexico has been somewhat more disappointing, its catchup with
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the rest of the world has been paralleled by increasing divergence between the more advanced
and the less advanced states of the country.
This paper explores the impact of a developing countrys higher trade openness on conver-
gence, not just with the rest of the world, but also within the liberalizing country. In addition to
addressing these questions of relative development, it also analyzes its e¤ect on global long-run
growth. This is important: although the rest of the world may become relatively worse o¤, in
absolute terms it may end up gaining due to the impact of higher trade openness on growth
rates.
Our modelling tool is an East-West framework with an exogenous division within the eastern
(and poorest) country. The East consists of an industrialized Core  which can potentially
host both manufactures and a research sector devoted to imitating western patents  and a
Periphery doomed to host just primary sectors under perfect competition. We assume that
international-trade barriers for our homogeneous (primary) good do not decay at the same
pace as those of manufactures, as if biased technological change was a¤ecting di¤erently the
transaction costs of both sectors.1 Since the western aggregate income is larger, an increase in
manufacturing trade openness induces a net inow of demand for eastern varieties, which raises
the relative wage of the Core with respect to the West. Simultaneously, the relative wage of the
Core with respect to the Periphery also rises, since primary goods remain barely as attractive
to foreign consumers as before. Then, these widening income di¤erentials within the East give
rise to Periphery-Core migrations, which also enhances peripheral wages and favors East-West
convergence. However, wages in the Core do not necessarily decay with migration, since some
of the immigrants will become researchers, enlarging the eastern imitation potential and the
fraction of world manufactures produced in the Core, which channels an even higher world
demand towards the latter location.
As for its e¤ects on growth, the agglomeration of labor in the Core turns out to be bene-
cial for global growth rates. In our framework imitation and innovation are complementary
activities, which implies that a higher eastern catch-up potential spurs innovation in the West.
The last e¤ect holds because stronger imitation will reduce western wages and subsequently
1For an empirical study that conrms this tendency, linked to the recent breakthrough of telecommunications,
see Rauch (1999).
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increase the value of a patent, raising the natural incentives to innovate. Taking all this into
account, any restriction to Periphery-Core migration proves to be harmful in terms of steady-
state growth, but not necessarily in terms of regional cohesion, since a higher catch-up potential
in the Core may boost internal divergence patterns in the East.
The participation of China in the world trade and investment systems involves not only
crucial consequences for the internal disparities within that country, but also for the interna-
tional relocation of signicant labor-intensive industries, which often shift from more developed
towards less developed countries. For example, as illustrated by Woo (2003), in mid-2003, the
electronic and electrical rms in Penang, Malaysia, employed 17 percent fewer workers than
in 2000. Meanwhile, Mexicos economic liberalization and trade integration in NAFTA has
also been related to (internal) regional divergence and the threat of a giant sucking sound
posed for some segments of the US economy. Well known empirical work has already estimated
a signicant e¤ect of international trade openness on higher growth and increasing regional
inequality for these countries (see e.g. Wei (1993), Rodriguez-Pose and Sanchez-Reaza (2002)).
However, the study of the connections between trade openness, growth and regional inequal-
ity in developing countries had remained at a largely statistical level up to very recent times
(see, e.g., Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996); Ying (1999); Kanbur and Zhang (2001); Fujita and
Hu (2001); Huang, Kuo and Kao (2003)). Just a few papers have tried to introduce some spe-
cic economic modelling into the debate on the sources of inequality. We will briey examine
the explanations proposed Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Giannetti (2002) and Hu (2002). More-
over, since our framework is derived from the Grossman and Helpman (1991) model, our main
innovation, compared to them, consists of explicitly incorporating trade costs in the model.
We also portray a dual economy within the East, which allows us to modify the steady-state
growth rate as trade shocks a¤ect di¤erently our two eastern regions and induce migratory ows
towards the areas where imitation takes place.
Focusing on the case of Mexico, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) link rising wage inequality to the
foreign capital inows that followed NAFTA, positively correlated with the demand for skilled
labor. Our model does not rely on FDI as the usual suspect behind regional divergence, since our
main driving force is a fall in manufacturing trade costs, which shifts world demand towards
the small economies once they are su¢ ciently opened to international trade. On the other
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hand, Giannetti (2002) develops an East-West endogenous-growth model inspired by similar EU
stylized facts (international convergence accompanied by divergence within countries). However,
gradual increases in trade openness are not the main driving force of the mechanism. Instead,
strong regional disparities originate from international knowledge-spillovers, which determine
regional comparative advantage and subsequent productive specialization. Finally, Hu (2002) is
also an economic geography model, inspired by the case of China, but it does not model explicitly
the Western economy and neither does it consider growth e¤ects. The only di¤erence in his
model between the Coastal and the Interior region is a di¤erential access to the Western market,
without further institutional distinctions. The presence of vertical linkages and rural-urban
migration also lead to agglomeration in the Coast as international trade costs fall. Nevertheless,
our imitation-potential mechanism is absent from his model, which leads him to support the
traditional view on the pro-convergence e¤ects of interregional migration.
It is important to note that our results crucially depend on the Periphery being exoge-
nously a rural economy, radically di¤erentiated from the rest of the East concerning productive
capabilities. However, we argue that  at least in the case of China  such a geo-economic
structure is not endogenously derived from the typical interplay of centripetal and centrifugal
forces, as described by a Core-Periphery model in a market economy. Instead, they come from
the deliberate decisions made by a body of political authorities, who face a trade-o¤ between
their own objectives and those of the common population. In other words, we are going to
argue in favor of the political-economy origins of the economic backwardness of Central and
Western China, as opposed to alternative economic-geography motivations, like those modeled,
for example, by Hu (2002). Therefore, this paper intends to describe the mechanism by which
current regional disparities are aggravated, but renounces to study the underlying rationale be-
hind the Cores specialization in manufactures and the peripheral specialization in the provision
of energy, minerals, food or cheap labor.
There is substantial evidence favoring a political-economy explanation for Chinas Core-
Periphery situation. Branstetter and Feenstra (1999) view the political process in China as
trading o¤ the social benets of increased trade and foreign direct investment, against the
losses incurred by state-owned enterprises due to such liberalization. One of the most solid
conclusions they reached during some discussions with rm managers was that, to some degree,
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most foreign-invested enterprises compete with state-owned rms. The second conclusion is
that "the Chinese government, both national and local, is acutely aware of that competition,
and has taken steps to impede the ability of foreign rms to compete in the Chinese market".
Accordingly, multinational executives have found related restrictions on their operations, e.g.
export requirements, localization requirements, restrictions on domestic market access, require-
ments for technology transfer, ...Therefore, foreign-invested rms have mostly located along the
coastal area "following a line of least resistance" (Gipouloux (1998)), i.e. FDI increases where
there are fewer state-owned companies involved in industrial organization. In this respect, we
reproduce a signicant paragraph from his text:
"With a jolt, the opening up of the country and the dynamics of economic reform
re-activated these divisions between coastal China and inland China, but they are simply the
traces of very ancient geo-economic dividing lines, still visible after having been blurred for three
decades (1949-1979), from the Communiststakeover to the beginning of the reforms. The 14
coastal cities that were opened in 1984 correspond essentially to the chain of ports opened under
diplomatic and military pressure after the Opium Wars."2
That is, there is something much deeper than a simple "home-market e¤ect" keeping those
divisions in place.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the properties of a generic
steady state, which initially shows a given distribution of populations in West, Core and Pe-
riphery. Section 3 contains the comparative-statics exercise (in the level of international trade
openness) that reproduces our stylized facts, while allowing for interregional migration within
the East. Section 4 concludes.
2There have been sincere attempts from the Chinese authorities to switch from an uneven-national-priority
strategy to a nation-wide implementation of FDI promotion. However, as Chunlai (1997) reports, "not only
has the process of di¤usion from the coastal region to the inland areas been slow, but also the outow of skilled
workers, technical personnel and capital from the inland areas to the coastal regions has been increasing. Perhaps,
more important is that the coastal region has been getting more freedom in economic decision making from the
central government than the inland regions".
3For a discussion on the highly distorted system of inland Chinas industrial relations, see e.g. Young (2000).
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1.2 The model without migration
1.2.1 Environment
Overview
In our framework, Periphery-Core migration will be responsible for the scale e¤ects that yield
higher global growth rates. Our steady state will be characterized by the intersection of two
curves: one of them describes the relative wage of the Core with respect to the Periphery for a
given distribution of eastern population between both locations; the second one, also known as
the "migration function", describes the amount of population willing to live in the Periphery
for a given relative wage. Now we will derive the rst of both curves, which implies solving the
whole dynamic model regardless of the migration decision, which will be considered in section
3.
Endowments
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), we consider 2 countries - East and West. One important
novelty is the existence of three regions, i.e. we also include a Periphery within the East. The
population of both countries is exogenously given (being Ls for the East and Ln for the West),
since we do not allow for international migration. Nevertheless, there can be migrations within
the East, which means that eastern people can move from Periphery to Core (and vice versa)
in response to economic-opportunity variables; i.e. Ls = La + Lc, where La (the peripheral
population) is an endogenous variable.
The availability of factors of production is di¤erent across regions, since every location has
distinctive institutional features. There are three main productive factors: labor, researchers
and nancial capital. Labor can be employed in agriculture (in the Periphery) or in manufactur-
ing (in the Core or the West), and researchers are exclusively located in the last two locations.
Researchers in the West are used to conceive new varieties (startups), whereas researchers in the
Core can only replicate the existing ones to produce them in the East at lower cost. Moreover,
there is perfect occupational mobility between local manufacturing workers and researchers, in
the sense that both have the same local earnings and are therefore indi¤erent between both
occupations. The distribution of the population in the West and the Core between researchers
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and manufacturing labor will be endogenously derived in the model.
A household (or individual) from location k owns a measure nk of western rms and ck
of eastern rms. The source of this nancial capital were the previous gross savings of the
household, which were used to nance the new manufacturing startups producing in the Core
( _ck) or the West ( _nk). When allocating their savings to startups from di¤erent locations,
consumers must take into account that rms from the West will be imitated from the Core and
drawn out of the market with some probability.
Preferences
Any representative household (or individual) k, living in that location k, maximizes (in every
period t) an intertemporal utility function W kt such as
W kt =
Z 1
t
e (s t) log

Us
 
Xis; As

ds (1.1)
where W kt reects the discounted utility ow that household k expects to obtain from period
t onwards by acquiring manufactures (grouped into the composite X) and the homogeneous
agricultural good (A). On the other hand, the particular form of Us reveals the relative weight
assigned to food and manufactures in the following way:
Us = X

s A
1 
s , where 0 <  < 1 (1.2)
The composite of manufactures Xs is a Dixit-Stiglitz subutility function over the aggregate
measure of varieties invented up to period s;
Xs =
"Z n(s)
0
xj (s)
 dj
# 1

(1.3)
where 0 <  < 1 is a positive measure of the substitutability between manufactures and xj (s)
quanties the household demand for variety j at time s; 8s  t: These preferences imply that
the individual appreciates the expansion of manufacturing diversity, since utility will grow as
expenditure is more thinly divided among a growing number of varieties.
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Technologies
In the global economy there is a continuum of industrial varieties with measure n, and n =
nn + nc (the addition of the measures from the West and the Core). This degree of product
variety expands over time due to innovation. Moreover, an increase in the local measure of
manufactures enlarges the stock of public knowledge and reduces future R&D costs. Grossman
and Helpmans local stocks of knowledge are equal to n in the West - since all patents were
originally made up there - and to nc in the core. This implies that there are no international
knowledge-spillovers.
The production function for every particular manufacture (and for the homogeneous primary
good) is identical and very simple: 1 unit of labor generates 1 unit of nal output. Labor is
the only factor in the production of the primary good, whereas prior to the production of any
manufacture it is necessary to incur a xed cost (to invent or imitate the corresponding patent),
which is nanced by means of gross savings. By free entry in the innovative (and imitative)
activity, such a xed cost is at least equal to the market value of the patent. This value decreases
with the local stock of public knowledge in this way:
vc  amwc
nc
; with equality when _nc > 0 (1.4)
vn  awn
n
; with equality when _n > 0 (1.5)
where vc and vn denote the values of eastern and western patents, respectively, whereas amnc
and an stand for the number of researchers needed to imitate a western patent in the Core and
to create a new variety in the West. Our variables wa; wc and wn denote the nominal wage in
the Periphery, the Core and the West, respectively. Later we will establish some necessary and
su¢ cient parameter restrictions so that imitation and innovation coexist, which implies that
wn =
nvn
a
;wc =
ncvc
am
(1.6)
Eastern researchers need to incur the previous xed cost in order to replicate a western patent,
while western researchers do it to invent one from scratch. On the other hand, we assume that
our primary good is traded costlessly, whereas our parameter   1 introduces the classical
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iceberg-notion of international trade costs for manufactures: it is necessary to buy  units of
that good abroad to consume 1 unit at home. That is, we introduce manufacturing trade costs
between East and West, but we assume away internal trade costs within the East.4
1.2.2 Static optimization
Productive rms must decide which prices to quote in every period to maximize prots. On
the other hand, free entry into the innovative (imitative) activity guarantees that the expected
stream of prots for the startup is equal to the actual cost of innovation (imitation).
Consumers in any location not only decide how much to save, which equity to buy and which
commodities to consume, but also choose their job (if they are not in the Periphery, they become
either manufacturing workers or researchers) and their location of residence. The job decision
is not problematic, since they will receive the local wage no matter whether they do research
or not. On the contrary, as is usual in economic geography, we assume that expectations are
adaptive when an eastern household chooses whether to migrate or not, i.e. they do not expect
other households to move at the same time.
The function W ks is intertemporally maximized with respect to its ultimate arguments
(xj(s);8j; 8s  t; A(s) 8s  t) at every period t, taking as given the expected temporal
paths vn (s) ; vc (s) ; n(s); pj (s) 8j and pa (s) ; 8s  t: As Grossman and Helpman do, this
problem can be decomposed into 2 parts:
- The static allocation of a given per-household expenditure Eks among the primary good and
all kind of manufactures, which gives rise to a demand function for each of these commodities.
- The choice of an optimal path for Eks ; given the possibility of saving and investing in equity
of eastern and western rms.
We will proceed now to describe the rst of both parts.
Lets denote by E the aggregate world expenditure and by  the proportion of E spent
by people from the West, which is an endogenous variable. Considering that demand for any
variety comes from both western and eastern consumers who face di¤erent c.i.f. prices, we can
derive the aggregate demand for any western (xn) and eastern manufacture (xc), taking into
account (1.2), (1.3) and our previous denition of  as follows:
4Since those internal trade costs do not change, without loss of generality we can make them equal to zero.
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xn =   p 2n 

E
nnp
1 2
n +  nc p
1 2
c
+
(1  )  E
 nnp
1 2
n + nc p
1 2
c

(1.7)
xc =   p 2c 

  E
nnp
1 2
n +  nc p
1 2
c
+
(1  ) E
 nnp
1 2
n + nc p
1 2
c

(1.8)
where 2= 11  . In expressions (1.7) and (1.8), as in Martin and Ottaviano (1999),  = 1 2
(0    1) is a measure of trade openness in the global economy with respect to manufactures:
Concerning rms, they maximize prots at any period s taking into account a demand
of the type (1.7) or (1.8) and the simple production function described above. As a result,
both utility and prot maximization from expressions (1.3), (1.7) and (1.8) result in a common
optimal price for all industrial rms in location k, which is a constant mark-up over marginal
costs:
pk =
wk

; for k = West, Core. (1.9)
Then, from (1.9), per-period operating prots for any manufacturing rm in location k are
k =

1  


wkxk for k =West, Core (1.10)
On the other hand, we assume that the wage di¤erential between West and Core is high
enough for eastern imitators to quote the unconstrained optimal mark-up. Therefore, this wide-
gap assumption will only be satised if the original manufacturer can not undercut the eastern
rm without incurring losses, i.e. i¤5
wc

  wn (1.11)
Given that the primary sector is characterized by perfect competition and free entry, the
agricultural price is equal to the peripheral wage and per-rm operating prots are zero. We
assume that international transaction costs for primary products remain unaltered. So, without
loss of generality, we state that these costs are just nil. Taking all this into account,
pa = wa =
(1  )E
La
(1.12)
5This assumption is useful to rule out strategic behavior in the pricing decisions of western and eastern rms.
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1.2.3 Dynamic optimization
Now we have to face the intertemporal allocation of expenditure and savings, not only to
distribute consumption along the time horizon, but also to nance new startups in the West
and the Core. In order to allocate expenditure and savings over time, any household k must
choose (in every period s) a variation in its portfolio composition, buying or selling equity from
eastern and western rms. During that process the household needs to keep in mind that (in
every period s) a fraction m = _ncnn of the western measure of varieties is copied by eastern
imitators, which implies that the previous owners of those rms will lose their equity.
Let n and c denote the current operating prots of any western and eastern industrial
rm, respectively. At every period s, a representative household from location k owns a measure
nk (s) of western rms and ck (s) of eastern rms. Moreover, fnk stands for the proportion
of gross savings devoted to buying western equity. We will explore the properties of an interior
equilibrium in which new startups from both countries are nanced (i.e. 0 < fnk < 1).
Our control variables are Ek (households expenditure) and fnk (s) ; whereas the state vari-
ables are nk (s) and ck (s) : Then, the present-value Hamiltonian faced by any household in
location k at time t for the period s is the following:
Hk (s) = e
 (s t): logEk (s) + nk (s)

(wk + nkn + ckc   Ek) fnk (s)
vn
 mnk

+(1.13)
+ck (s)

(wk + nkn + ckc   Ek) (1  fnk (s))
vc

(1.14)
The rst-order condition for an interior solution for fnk (s) is the following:
nk (s)
vn (s)
=
ck (s)
vc (s)
; 8s (1.15)
The rst-order condition with respect to Ek (s) yields, due to equation (1:15) ; that
e (s t)
1
Ek (s)
=
nk (s)
vn (s)
=
ck (s)
vc (s)
; 8s (1.16)
And therefore, by di¤erentiating and using the rst-order conditions with respect to the state
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variables,
_E
E
=
_Ec
Ec
=
_En
En
=
_Ea
Ea
=
n
vn
 m  + _vn
vn
=
c
vc
  + _vc
vc
(1.17)
The last expression shows how, in equilibrium, the protability of western and eastern manu-
facturing rms must satisfy an arbitrage condition period by period.
1.2.4 Description of dynamic equilibrium without migration
System of di¤erential equations
Now, by grouping terms, we can dene A = Envn and B =
E
ncvc
. To characterize a dynamical
system in A; B and c = nnc , we need to know rst the dynamic behavior of the measures of
manufacturing varieties, nc and n. We will follow the evolution of the aggregate measure of
manufactures in the core and the global economy ( _ncnc ;
_n
n) by looking at the labor-market-clearing
conditions. These equilibrium conditions in the core and the north can be specied considering
the available production function and the technology in the imitation and innovation processes:
Lc = am
_nc
nc
+ ncxc (1.18)
Ln = a
_n
n
+ nnxn (1.19)
On the other hand, the system describes the dynamics of A, B and c, but the separate evolutions
of E, vc and vn can not be disentangled. As a consequence, Grossman and Helpman have one
degree of freedom to normalize
E(t) = 1, 8t (1.20)
which implies (by equation (1.4)) that
A =
1
awn
; B =
1
amwc
(1.21)
Instead of A and B, we will be interested in the evolution of the local nominal wages wn and
wc. Therefore, using (1.7), (1.8), (1.10), (1.17), (1.18), (1.19) and (1.21), we are ready to set up
the complete system of di¤erential equations in wn, wc and c (when trade openness is almost
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perfect, i.e. when  ! 1 ) as follows:
_wn
wn
=
h (1 )
am

w2 1n
w2 1n +(c 1)w2 1c

+ 
i
+
h
Ln
a   (c 1)awn

w2 1c
w2 1n +(c 1)w2 1c
i
_wc
wc
= +
h
Lc
am
  1am

w2 1n
w2 1n +(c 1)w2 1c
i
_c
c =
h
Ln
a   (c 1)awn

w2 1c
w2 1n +(c 1)w2 1c
i
 
h
Lc
am
  am

w2 1n
w2 1n +(c 1)w2 1c
i (1.22)
We will try to provide some intuition for the previous system of di¤erential equations. Lets
begin focusing on the rst equation: the rst term in square brackets contains the increase in
nominal wages due to expenditure. Expenditure will raise more nominal wages the higher is
the discount rate (): But we also have another negative term ( (1 )am

w2 1n
w2 1n +(c 1)w2 1c

) next
to the discount rate, and we can see that its absolute value is decreasing in c = nnc : That is,
expenditure will make western wages grow more the higher is c, i.e. the lower is the imitation-
potential of the Core. This happens because when the imitation potential is very low (c is very
high), the expected life of a western patent is high and the prots o¤ered by western rms in
a given period are consequently low. This encourages people to spend (instead of saving and
investing in western startups), which tends to increase nominal wages.
Lets have a look now at the second term (in square brackets) of the rst equation. Its
interpretation is much more straightforward: western wages will increase more the higher is
innovation ( _nn), since higher innovation entails more demand for labor in the West. And inno-
vation will be faster the more researchers (and the less manufacturing workers) you can nd
in the West. Since a higher imitation potential (a lower c) curtails the western demand for
manufacturing workers, innovation (and wages) in the West will tend to go up the lower is c.
Therefore, in the rst equation we can see that any variation in the eastern imitation
potential (i.e. in c) has two opposite e¤ects on western wages. On the one hand, as the expected
life of a patent is shortened by more imitation, people receive higher annual prots and therefore
save more (and spend less), reducing the growth rate of western wages. On the other hand,
more imitation makes western workers shift to research (rather than manufacturing), which
raises innovation and spurs future demand for labor in the West, raising the growth rate of
nominal wages there.
The other two equations are easier to interpret. The second just tells us that wages in the
Core will grow more the higher is ( _ncnc ), since demand for labor will increase there. The third
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equation obviously reects that c is increasing in the speed of innovation relative to the speed
of imitation.
Innovation and imitation in steady state
If we prove that there are some values c*; wn* and wc* for which _wn = _wc = _c = 0, this will
imply that there exists a steady state for our system of di¤erential equations established in
(1.22). From the second di¤erential equation in (1.22), in our candidate to steady state
1
am

w2 1n
w2 1n + (c  1)w2 1c

= 

Lc
am
+ 

(1.23)
and from the third equation, (1.18), (1.19) and (1.23) we get that
g =
_n
n
=
_nc
nc
= (1  ) Lc
am
   > 0 (1.24)
We can observe that our innovation growth rate is exclusively determined by the monopoly
power, the discount rate and the imitation capacity of the Core. It may look rather odd that
the global growth rate does not depend on the innovative conditions in the West. In fact, this
extreme result depends on the absence of international (West-East) knowledge spillovers. Once
they are allowed in Grossman and Helpman (1991)s model, it can be shown that both countries
play a role in the determination of the steady-state growth rate: what matters is that such a
rate is always increasing in the imitation capacity of the Core.
Therefore, from (1.4) and (1.24),
_vc
vc
=
_vn
v
=  g (1.25)
This implies that the value of every rm shrinks in steady state at a constant rate. In other
words, nancial capital depreciates at the rate of innovation, and it is necessary to save to
make up for that depreciation period by period. Now, from equations (3.11), (1.25) and also
the arbitrage condition (1.17), we are ready to obtain reduced-form equations for the prots of
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any western and eastern industrial rm:
n = (+m+ g) vn; c = (+ g) vc (1.26)
It is useful, as Grossman and Helpman do, to express c as a function of m and g, where m = _ncnn
is our imitation rate. Since m = g 1(c 1) , we can solve now for c:
c =
m+ g
m
(1.27)
As a consequence, from (1.4), (1.10), (1.19), (1.26) and (1.27), we can restate the arbitrage
condition corresponding to western manufactures as follows:
n
vn
=

1  


Ln
a
  g

m+ g
g

= +m+ g (1.28)
By combining (1.24) and (1.28), we can already derive a formal expression for the steady-state
imitation rate m:
m =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0, if Lna  Lcam
(1 )
h
Lc
am
 Ln
a
i
(1 ) Lc
am
 

 (1 )
h
Lc
am
 Ln
a
i ; if Lcam  Lna  Lcam   1 
1; if Lna  Lcam  

1 
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(1.29)
As could be expected, m rises with the imitation potential of the Core relative to the western
innovation capacity:

Lc
am
  Lna

: We can already establish a rst set of parameter restrictions
so that the global economy exhibits a positive innovation rate and a positive measure of manu-
factures operate in both countries. That is, we want that 1 < c <1, which requires 0 < m <1
and 0 < g <1: As we prove in the Appendix, this initial condition can be simply summarized
as follows:
0 <

Lc
am
  Ln
a

<

1   (1.30)
Absolute and relative wages in steady state
Now we will see how steady-state relative wages change in response to a fall in trade costs. But
there are still several endogenous variables to be determined that are crucial for our comparative
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statics. Two of them are the relative wage of the Core with respect to the West (! = wcwn ) and
: From equations (1.7), (1.8), (1.9), (1.18), (1.19) and (3.11), we can get an idea of the
determinants of ! as follows:
xn
xc
=
Ln   ag
Lc   amg
m
g
= !2C(; Lc; !) (1.31)
where C(; Lc; !) =
24 (g=m)!2 1+ + (1 )(g=m)!2 1+1

(g=m)!2 1+ +
(1 )
(g=m)!2 1+1
35 (1.32)
We can see from the left-hand side of (1.31) that only the supply-side fundamentals - i.e.
industrial workforces in both countries and innovation and imitation long-term capacities - can
modify the relative size of rms (xnxc ): That means that any variation in international trade
openness () will be exactly o¤set in the long run by a countervailing adjustment of !:
Our term C(; Lc; !) is a direct measure of the home-market advantage of one of the coun-
tries to o¤er higher wages for similar supply-side fundamentals. The country with a higher
demand capacity (i.e. the West if  > 1=2) will be able to reward better the labor force, since
less demand will be wasted paying transaction costs there. Before we explore the relative-wage
consequences of a rise in , we need to express  in terms of the parameters for a steady-state
situation. Next lemma will be of considerable help.
Lemma 1:
In any steady state without net migratory ows, any households expenditure is identical to
that households income period by period. Therefore, the steady-state aggregate western and
eastern incomes are equal to  and 1  , respectively, and there are no net savings.
Proof. See Appendix.
Subsequently, lets derive some formal expressions of western and eastern aggregate income.
An implication of the last lemma is that a households gross savings in steady state just cover the
depreciation of previously-owned capital. Therefore, a representative household from location
k will have an income
yk = Ek = wk + ckamwc + nka

g
m+ g

wn
where ck and nk denote the fraction of eastern and western rms, respectively, owned by that
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household. From (1.12), (3.11) and our denition of  it is possible to come out with a neat
expression of this variable as a fraction between zero and one:
 =
1
1 +

1 
wn

+ !Lc +
h
(1 nnLn)a

g
m+g

+(1 cnLn)am!
i
Ln
h
1+

nna

g
m+g

+cnam!
i (1.33)
In the denominator of (1.33), wn is an endogenous variable that has not been fully specied
yet in terms of the parameters: So, we need to obtain an expression for local absolute wages as
well. Lets dene rst
Q =
m
g
!1 2 (1.34)
Now, if we plug (1.7) into (1.19), divide numerator and denominator of the latter expression by 
wn

1 2 and rearrange, eventually we nd that
wn =

(Ln   ag)


1 + Q
+
(1  ) 
 +Q

(1.35)
Proceeding in a similar way, we can solve for wc from (1.18) as follows:
wc =

(Lc + am)


1 + Q
+
(1  )
 +Q

Q (1.36)
In the next section we derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an increase in ! in
response to a marginal rise in trade openness () :
Comparative Statics
Proposition 1:
Concerning the distribution of nancial wealth, assume that
nnLn ! 1 ; cnLn ! 0+; cc = ca = 1=Ls (1.37)
where kl is equal to the proportion of aggregate wealth from location k owned by any household
living in location l. In that case, when the imitation potential of the Core is su¢ ciently small, the
relative wage of the Core with respect to the West (!) rises in response to higher trade openness
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if - and only if - the initial degree of trade openness is high enough, i.e. lim
Lc!amLna
+
 
d!
d

> 0
i¤ 2 > 1 
Proof. See the Appendix.
There are two opposite e¤ects of a reduction of international transaction costs on the relative
wage !: The rst one has to do with the di¤erence in aggregate income between East and West:
a wealthier West will be likely to raise its demand for every eastern manufacture beyond the
increase in aggregate eastern demand for any western good. This would result in a rise of ! (and
international convergence6) if there were no other active forces. Lets call this the relative-size
e¤ect.
But there is still another e¤ect. Since most of the industrial varieties are initially produced
in the West, toughness of competition increases much more for the smaller market in the East
(a rm suddenly faces many more competitors there as  falls), which tends to depress ! and
generate divergence. The strength of this price-index e¤ect decreases with the initial degree of
trade openness (), since higher values of  imply that local price indices are almost identical to
start with (i.e. the international market is almost fully open from the beginning). This means
that when the initial level of trade costs is already very low, the demand ow is relatively more
important, and convergence prevails.7
Therefore, for d!d to be positive we do not only need a large di¤erential in the size of both
countries, but also a high enough initial value of : Under the assumptions of Proposition 1,
a very high relative-size e¤ect has been guaranteed (since the imitation capacity of the Core
is innitesimal), which makes the initial level of trade openness the only determinant of the
evolution of relative wages.8 In this respect, this proposition may shed some light on the
determinants of protectionist policies: they may be more likely to arise in small countries when
the current level of trade openness is low enough.
6We will talk about convergence in this paper when there exists convergence in nominal income, instead of real
income or indirect utility. The reason why we adopted such an arbitrary convention is that nominal convergence
is usually the aspect detected by national accounts, given the di¢ culty to access good local price-indices.
7The distributional assumptions we make in Proposition 1 are just technical (simplifying) assumptions. We
can prove that it would be possible to distribute all world (nancial) wealth in a strictly egalitarian way and the
main result would not be a¤ected. Furthermore, by making the Cores initial imitation capacity innitesimal
we guarantee the relative-size e¤ect, and make the price-index e¤ect the only relevant force in the comparative
statics.
8We have proved that the distributional assumptions could be relaxed while preserving our main result.
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But we would like to know what happens to relative incomes also out of this extreme
situation, i.e. for any initial distribution of eastern population between Core and Periphery.
Our next objective will be obtaining the function !c = wcwa = f (La; ) that determines the
labor-market-clearing relative wage in the East as a function of La and : The intersection of
this curve with an exogenous migration function !c = h(La), which yields the amount of people
willing to live in the Periphery as a function of the relative wage, will o¤er the nal-steady-state
values (L*a(),!c*()):
1.3 The model with migration
In this model, the introduction of migratory movements is the only way to strengthen the
catch-up potential of the Core and henceforth increase the steady-state growth rate. Why are
innovation and imitation complementary in this model? The answer is twofold:
- Firstly, as the imitation potential rises, the demand for manufacturing labor in the West
goes down and then a higher proportion of the western population is devoted to research.
- Secondly, as the imitation potential increases, the expected life of a western patent shortens,
which forces western rms to o¤er higher prots (given the arbitrage condition) and encourages
more saving and investment in new startups.
And how can we get Periphery-Core migrations in the rst place? We claim that such
a Periphery-Core migration will arise if the Core is initially favored by trade shocks. These
results can be related, for example, to the Chinese experience: Solinger (1995) and Poncet
(2006) document how - despite severe migration restrictions imposed by the government - the
amount of "oating population" undertaking rural-urban migration could reach 150 million
people, and they are driven mostly by economic motivations in the destination area. "O¢ cials
say that by 2020 about 60% of population will be living in cities or towns, which implies that
more than 200 million new people will move from the countryside by then" (The Economist,
page 29). For those people, migration obviously has a cost. But this paper tries to shed some
light on the static and dynamic gains for those migrants, for the whole Chinese population and
for the rest of the world. Let´s now face the foundations of the migration decision.
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1.3.1 Migration
In this subsection we draw partially from Faini (1996) to obtain a microfoundation for the
migration function (!c = h(La)).
Since we assumed away internal trade costs within the East, the price indices in both Core
and Periphery will be identical. Therefore, a comparison of local real incomes reduces to a
comparison of local nominal incomes. We will also assume that the utility derived from a given
income in the Core is lower than that in the Periphery, which may be due to congestion e¤ects
or undesirable living conditions in an industrial location. That asymmetry will be summarized
by the parameter  ( 1
1+ Ls
am
   1).
We are going to assume some degree of heterogeneity in the eastern population with respect
to their willingness to live in the Core (summarized by i, where i measures the willingness of
individual i to live in the Core). That heterogeneity will show in a certain statistical distribution
of parameter  among the Chinese people: in particular, it will be assumed that  follows a
uniform distribution U [ 1
1+ Ls
am
; 1]
Since we will not consider migration costs, the individual who is indi¤erent between living
in the Periphery or in Core for a given ratio of incomes will be implicitly characterized by the
expression
(wc +
1
Ls
amwc) = wa +
1
Ls
amwc
where 1Ls amwc is the net nancial income received by any Chinese individual, and
 represents
the willingness of the last individual to move to the Core at the current real wages. Rearranging,
we can rewrite the previous expression as
 =
1 + am!c
1
Ls
!c

1 + am!c
1
Ls

And the amount of population living in the Core will be given, after some algebra, by
Lc = LsP

   = 1 
1+am
!c
Ls
!c

1+am
!c
Ls

Ls
Ls+am
=

1  1
!c

Ls
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i.e. the previous expression can be rewritten as
!c = h(La) =
Ls
La
(1.38)
This is a decreasing and convex function in La, which shows the steady-state amount of eastern
population willing to live in the Periphery for a given relative wage. In the next section we will
spell out the intuition and details of our main results.
1.3.2 Description of dynamic equilibrium with migration
Since we want to reproduce some stylized facts, it is convenient for us to rule out any price-index
e¤ect threatening to abort East-West convergence. Therefore, trade costs should be initially
low enough to turn demand ows into the main result of an incremental openness. Then, the
relative-size e¤ect will remain as the single driving force. Therefore,  > 1=2 appears as a
natural requirement that (together with   ! 1 ) could be enough to achieve international
convergence in per-capita income. But lets provide rst a su¢ cient condition for  > 1=2 in
terms of the parameters.
Lemma 2 :
Given our distributional assumptions in Proposition 1, lim !1  () > 1=2 if Ln > L^n (Lc) ;
where L^n (Lc) is a monotone increasing function.
Proof. See Appendix.
As we can see, it turns out that international di¤erences in aggregate income amount to a
di¤erence in the size of populations. The larger is the size of Ln relative to Lc;the larger will be
the innovative capacity of the West relative to the imitation potential of the East. This implies
that a larger proportion of the global array of manufacturing varieties will be produced in the
West, raising the western real wage relative to the eastern one.
The wide-gap assumption made explicit in (1.11) involves that lim !1  (!) < , from
which we can also derive the following lemma.
Lemma 3:
There exists a unique upper-bound Lc  Lc such that the wide-gap assumption holds
together with the coexistence of a positive measure of western and eastern manufactures; i.e.
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there exists a unique Lc such that (1.11) and (1.30) are simultaneously satised i¤
am
Ln
a
< Lc  Lc < am

Ln
a
+

1  

8a; am
Proof. See Appendix.
That is, for the Cores producers to be able to quote the unconstrained mark-up over mar-
ginal cost, it is necessary that the Cores population - which determines its imitation potential
- is small enough relative to the western one: otherwise, the nominal wage in the Core would
be too high and the western rms would nd it protable to undercut.
Our notion of steady state is partially characterized by the following equality:
!c = f (La; ) = h(La) (1.39)
where !c = h(La) is our migration function.
Now we will endogenously determine the curve !c = f (La; ) : From (1.12), (1.24) and
(1.36) we can obtain that
lim
!1 
!c = lim
!1 
f (La; ) = lim
!1 
24 La
(1  )


Q(La;)
1+Q(La;)

(Ls   La + am)
35 (1.40)
where
lim
!1 
Q(La; ) =
24 (1  )
h
Ls La
am
  Lna
i
  (1  )
h
Ls La
am
  Lna
i
351  "  (Ls   La + am)
Ln   a(1 )am (Ls   La) + a
#
(1.41)
Here we can appreciate the two basic e¤ects of a declining peripheral labor force (# La) on !c:
- First, the numerator and denominator of (1.40) directly capture the straightforward labor-
supply e¤ect : if new immigrants come from Periphery to Core, !c will tend to decrease for a
given value of Q.
- Secondly, the quotient Q(La;)1+Q(La;) is decreasing in La because it reects the gain in imitation
potential of the Core after an inow of former peripheral workers. This force tends to increase
the fraction of the total measure of manufactures produced in the Core, which channels world
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demand to this location and can potentially raise wc:
The relative strength of these two e¤ects varies along the relevant range of values of La :
Ls   amLna ; Ls   Lc

. In fact, Q(La; ) acts as a positive measure of the imitation potential in
the core. Moreover, additional migration reinforces much more that potential the lower Q(La; )
is. In other words, once you have copied a high proportion of western varieties, it is harder
for you to raise your local wage by further imitating: you have to compete - every time more
toughly - with more and more producers in your own location.
In fact, since by (1.40) f (0; ) = f
 
Ls   amLna ; 

= 0 8 and our function f is continuous
in La;we know for sure that f (La; ) shows an inverted-U shape 8. That is, we can observe
both an upward-sloping part of the curve - where the labor-supply e¤ect is stronger - and a
downward-sloping one, with a dominant imitation-potential e¤ect9(see Figure 1).
In Figures 1 and 2 the horizontal axis measures the amount of population in the Periphery
(La), and the vertical axis represents the relative wage of the Core with respect to the Periphery
(!c):We can observe in Figure 1 how - due to the coexistence of a labor-supply and an imitation-
potential e¤ect with opposite e¤ects on !c - the curve f(La; ) has both an upward-sloping and
a downward-sloping region.
In order to draw our arrows of motion, we have assumed that agents form their expectations
in an adaptive way, as is usual in economic geography. This means that, when deciding how
to allocate their nancial capital, individuals take local populations as given and do not expect
them to change; by the same token, when making their migratory choice, eastern individuals
do not expect relative wages to vary at all (even when the economy is out of the steady state).
As a result of this, we can see that the system has two stable steady states and an intermediate,
saddle-path unstable one.
The rst stable steady state concentrates all eastern population in the Periphery and there
is no manufacturing activity at all within the East (La = Ls). It is necessary to have a critical
mass of population (and researchers) in the Core to channel a su¢ ciently high share of world
demand towards that location and raise the local wage, which will subsequently attract more
population to repeat the cycle. If such a critical mass is achieved, the system will evolve
naturally towards the second stable steady state, characterized by !c = f (La; ) = h(La) and
9Provided that the whole range of values of La satises the wide-gap assumption, i.e. if Ls   amLna < Lc :
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Figure 1-1: E¤ect of trade liberalization
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Figure 1-2: E¤ect of Core-Periphery redistribution
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also by @h@La <
@f
@La
< 0.
In order to replicate our stylized facts, we will assume that the economy is initially situated
in the second steady state (marked with a blue circle in Figure 1) and it receives a trade shock
that will shift the f (La; )-curve upwards, as represented by the transit from the red curve
to the green curve in Figure 1. That is, the main characteristics of our relevant steady state
are signicant agglomeration e¤ects on the Cores labor productivity and a considerable labor
stickiness within the East.
1.3.3 Main results
As anticipated above, the main results we need to reproduce are international (East-West)
convergence in per capita income, interregional (Core-Periphery) divergence within the East,
higher concentration of labor in the Core and higher (global) growth rates. It may look coun-
terintuitive the coexistence of potential Core-Periphery migrations and interregional divergence
within the East. The reason why both phenomena coexist is that interregional divergence is
obtained in terms of real income, but not in terms of utility. In the section about the derivation
of migration functions, we assumed that people su¤er from a congestion disutility in the Core
(i.e. the marginal utility of a given income in the Core is lower than in the Periphery), and the
parameter measuring congestion disutility follows a probability distribution. As more people
move to the Core, the congestion disutility of the last mover becomes higher, and the ratio of
Core/Periphery incomes is also higher than at the beginning.
Now we will obtain a su¢ cient condition for the ratio Rca =
per-capita income in the core
per-capita income in periphery to
increase in response to a marginal rise in :
Proposition 2:
Let Rca =
Yc=(Ls La)
Ya=La
be the core-periphery relative per-capita income. If in the original
steady state the following conditions are satised: a) Ln > L^n(Ls); b) amLna < Lc < L

c ; c)
 ! 1 ; then :
dRca
d
> 0;
d!c
d
> 0;
dg
d
> 0;
dLa
d
< 0
Proof. See Appendix.
With a sudden rise in , the dominance of the relative-size e¤ect - when we are close
to full openness - weakens the home-market advantage of the West. The subsequent rise in
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!c attracts a net migratory ow from Periphery to Core and increases our eastern imitation
potential. Hence, the decrease in c caused by migrations channels more world demand towards
eastern manufactures and exerts an upward pressure on the labor costs in the Core. This force
countervails the labor-supply e¤ect, which usually happens when industrial competition within
the core is soft enough and eastern labor force is su¢ ciently sticky.
Given the signicant agglomeration e¤ects on labor productivity detected in the EU by
Ciccone (2002) and in China by Au and Henderson (2006), accepting that @f@La < 0 (i.e. that we
are on the downward-sloping part of the function f(La; )) does not look counterfactual. Neither
does the extreme (interregional) stickiness of labor in many European and Asian countries (see
Bentolila (1997); Fujita and Hu (2001)).
Lets try to face now the East-West convergence issue in a similar fashion.
Proposition 3:
If in our initial steady state amLna  Lc  Lc , Ln > L^n (Ls) and  ! 1  ; then necessarily
dRns
d < 0, where Rns is the relative per-capita income of the West with respect to the East.
Proof. See Appendix.
There are three forces involved in the comparative-statics evolution of relative East-West
per-capita income, two of which exactly o¤set each other. These 2 opposite forces, whose joint
e¤ect is nil, can be described as follows:
- First, the net inow of workers to the core enhances the innovation rate and, consequently,
also the demand for labor in the West, which tends to raise wn:
- At the same time, although the global economy innovates faster, a higher imitation poten-
tial raises the proportion of eastern manufactures. Hence, a lower proportion of total nancial
wealth owned by the West exactly makes up for the higher demand for researchers in that
country. Therefore, the only e¤ect capable of modifying  comes from the aggregate demand
for the manufactures produced in the West. This aggregate demand goes down in terms of our
numeraire, since the western home-market advantage becomes weaker.
Corollary:
If in our initial steady state amLna  Lc  Lc < am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
; Ln > L^n (Ls) and  ! 1  ;
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then, in our comparative-statics exercise
dRca
d
> 0;
d!c
d
> 0;
dg
d
> 0;
dLa
d
< 0;
d
d
< 0;
d!c
d
> 0 and
d!a
d
> 0 (where !a =
wa
wn
) :
Proof. Straightforward from (1.12), (3.11) and the last 2 propositions.
It is remarkable that - in our framework - a decrease in international trade costs could be
potentially Pareto-improving. This is true because both eastern locations unambiguously gain
in terms of steady-state indirect utility; and although the western per-capita (nominal) income
falls, that e¤ect could be o¤set by the higher growth rate for a low enough discount rate ().
Furthermore, Figure 2 shows how an intensication of a Core-Periphery income-redistribution
policy within the East could reduce peripheral wages, wages in the Core (due to the foregone
agglomeration e¤ects) and the growth rate of the global economy10 (for an analytical derivation
of this result, see the Appendix). Nevertheless, structural changes in the Periphery - even if
nanced with transfers - could also enlarge the scale e¤ects within the East and yield both
convergence within China and higher global growth rates. However, this model does not lend
itself to the study of public investment (there are no public goods) and structural change, so
we can not assess quantitatively the relative virtue of promoting migration versus restructuring
in the Periphery.11
1.4 Conclusions
We have studied an East-West endogenous growth model where exogenous institutional features
play a major role: they determine the relative incidence of a biased shock in trade openness
on two distinct eastern regions. Within our eastern country, we have considered a perfectly-
10Therefore, the Hukou system may be having deleterious economic e¤ects over China and even over the rest
of the world, although its implementation could make sense from a political-economy point of view (see Solinger
(1995)).
11De la Fuente (2004) creates a framework to study the optimal central-planner allocation of public investment
among regions, for a given degree of income redistribution that can not be extended. When calibrated for the
case of Spain, he nds that the allocation of public investment has probably been too redistributive. His model
is essentially static and does not consider pecuniary externalities across locations or induced modications in the
local populations, as we do. If his model considered all these e¤ects - according to our framework - we presume
that the case for redistribution through public investment in Spain would be even weaker (we can not forget
that this conclusion depends on the maintenance of a given interregional solidarity through income-redistribution
programmes).
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competitive market structure for the Periphery together with some sources of agglomeration
economies in the Core. As a result, we have reproduced our stylized facts, i.e. the coexistence
of per-capita income convergence between countries and divergence within the same countries.
The existence of scale e¤ects generates a trade-o¤ between Core-Periphery convergence and
global steady-state growth. But not necessarily a trade-o¤ between long-run growth rates and
East-West convergence.
Our model has potentially interesting implications for the role of interregional transfers.
In particular, we conclude that, no matter how generous interregional transfers are, if they
do not help transform peripheral productive structures they can not prevent an asymmetric
exposure to trade shocks. If transfers also refrained migratory ows, they could reduce the
core-periphery gap, though only by lowering all easternerslabor income and the growth rate
of the global economy.
On the other hand, if transfers were useful to industrialize the Periphery the scale-e¤ects
would be larger. In fact, this seems to be the recent choice of the Chinese authorities, aiming to
reconcile higher growth and Core-Periphery convergence by means of the setup of new economic
infrastructure in the latter location. This looks like an argument to advocate structural changes
in the Periphery as opposed to direct transfers to household consumption. But, in order to
elaborate on this, we need to do some welfare analysis requiring transitional dynamics and
an explicit formulation of both migratory costs and structural-change costs, since we need a
di¤erent framework to assess the relative virtue of promoting migration versus structural change
in the Periphery. This is an interesting avenue for future research.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Steady-state fraction of manufacturing varieties in the Core
By (1.22), (1.26) and our denition of steady state,

1 +
1  

c
(c  1)
 
Ln
a
 

(1  ) Lc
am
  

 

(1  ) Lc
am
  

1
(c  1) = +
Ln
a
(1.42)
33
Finally, solving for c in (1.42) we can get that
c =

(1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i (1.43)
The trivial fact that n  nc; i.e. c 1, imposes our restriction (1.30) on the value of the
parameters.
1.6.2 Income-redistribution policy between Core and Periphery
We are going to introduce a proportional income tax accompanied by a lump-sum rebate for the
Chinese population. As will be shown, this form of Core-Periphery redistribution will reduce the
willingness of Chinese population to live in the Core. Now we can characterize the willingness
of the last individual to move to the Core () as follows:


wc

1 + am
1
Ls

(1   ) +G

=

wa + amwc
1
Ls

(1   ) +G (1.44)
where   measures the proportional income tax and G the corresponding lump-sum rebate.
The balanced-budget condition that links the values of  and G can be expressed as
LsG =   [wcam + wcLc + waLa]
Solving for G and replacing the value of G in (1.44), we can obtain an expression for  such as
 =
Ls (1   ) + (am +  Lc)!c
!c [Ls (1   ) + am +  Lc]
It is nally easy to check that
lim
!0
d 
d 
> 0 i¤ !c > 1
i.e. within the relevant range of values for !c, higher taxation implies an upward shift of the
curve h(La) and a lower steady-state population in the Core.
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1.6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Lets rewrite the second part of expression (1.31) as follows:
C (; Lc; !) =

 
m!1 2 + g

+ (1  )   m!1 2 + g
 (m!1 2 + g) + (1  ) (m!1 2 + g) (1.45)
After a marginal increase in ; the right-hand side of (1.31) has to remain constant, because
nothing is altered in the left-hand side of the equality. Therefore,
lim
Lc!amLna
+
(dC=d)
C
=   lim
Lc!amLna
+
2 d!d
!
(1.46)
Then, if we take logs of (1.45) and compute the total derivative, we can get that
(dC=d)
C
=
 
2   (1  )


1    1  2 
 
d!
d
h
Q (2  1)  2     + (1  ) 2  1    1  2+ dd!   1  2i


1    1  2 (1.47)
From (1.46) and (1.47),
d!
d
=
!
 
2   (1  )
2   1    1  2+ (2  1)Q 2     + (1  ) 2  1    1  2+ dd! !  1  2
(1.48)
In order to determine the sign of lim
Lc!amLna
+
d!
d
! ; it is useful to know the limit-value of !
when Lc ! amLna
+
: From (1.31),
lim
Lc!amLna
+
Ln   ag
Lc   amg
m
g
=
"
lim
Lc!amLna
+
!2
#"
lim
Lc!amLna
+
C(; Lc; !)
#
(1.49)
Our parameter restriction (1.30) guarantees that g > 0 and then, from (1.29), (1.45) and (1.49),
0 =

lim
Lc!amLna
+ !2
 

1 (1 2)

: As we can infer from (1.33), 0< 
1 (1 2) <1 provided
that  > 0: Then, as a consequence,
lim
Lc!amLna
+
! = 0+ (1.50)
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Moreover, since we can easily check that lim
Lc!amLna
+

d
d!

is nite, from (??) ; (1:34) and
(1.50) it is possible to conclude that lim
Lc!amLna
+

d
d!

! = lim
Lc!amLna
+(Q) = 0; and there-
fore, by (1.48),
lim
Lc!amLna
+
d!
d
!
=
2   (1  )
2   1    1  2 (1.51)
Since the denominator of (1:51) is positive,
lim
Lc!amLna
+

d!
d

> 0 i¤ 2 > (1  ) (1.52)
Next, from (1.33) and (1.35) we can obtain that
lim
Lc!amLna
+
(1  )
wn
=
(1  )

(Ln + a) (1.53)
Now, if we plug (1.53) into (1.33), we can restate condition (1.52) only in terms of the parame-
ters:
lim
Lc!amLna
+

d!
d

> 0 iff nn >
1

 
1 + 2
 " 1    1 + 2
a
+
1
Ln
#
(1.54)
Finally, taking into account our assumptions in (1.37),
lim
Lc!amLna
+

d!
d

> 0 iff 2 >
1  

1.6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From our denition of Rca; our distributional assumptions (1.37) and Lemma 1 we can
derive that in any steady state
Rca =
!c [(Ls   La) + am (1  caLa)]
(1 + caam!c) (Ls   La)
(1.55)
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From (1.39), any marginal variation in  must yield the following migratory reaction between
steady states:
lim
!1 
dLa
d
= lim
!1 
24 @f@
@h
@La
  @f@La

35 (1.56)
The assumptions of the proposition guarantee that the denominator in (1.56) is negative. As
to the numerator, from (1.31) and (1.45) we can obtain that
lim
!1 
@f
@
=
La
(1  )

(Ls   La)
"
(2   1)Q+ @Q@
(1 +Q)2
#
(1.57)
and
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g

(2  1)
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! 2
 
lim
!1 
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@

(1.58)
Now, from (1.31) and (1.45) we can conclude that
! = C 
1
2 (; La; !) :

lim
!1 
!

8, since lim
!1 
C (; La; !) = 1 (1.59)
After some computations, we can additionally get from Lemma 3 and (1.45) that
lim
!1 
@C
@
= 1  2 < 0 (1.60)
Finally, expressions (1.59) and (1.60) imply that
lim
!1 
@!
@
=

lim
!1 
! 2

:
(2   1)
2 > 0 (1.61)
If we now go backwards, plugging (1.61) into (1.58) and then (1.58) into (1.57), our nal
result after rearranging is that lim!1 
@f
@ =
La
(1 )

(Ls La) : lim!1 
"
m
g

(2 1)!1 2
(1+Q)22
#
> 0: This
positive sign means, by (1.56), that dLad < 0: And hence, from (3.11),
dg
d > 0: Since
dRca
d
=
@Rca
@!c
@!c
@
+

@Rca
@!c
@!c
@La
+
@Rca
@La

:
dLa
d
(1.62)
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we must obtain now the expressions for @Rca@!c and
@Rca
@La
to clarify unambiguously which is the
sign of (1.62). Then, from (1.37) and (1.55),
@Rca
@!c
=

1 +
am (1  caLa)
(Ls   La)

:
1
(1 + caam!c)
2 (1.63)
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am (1  caLa)
(Ls   La)2
:
!c
(1 + caam!c)
(1.64)
If we consider simultaneously (1.62) and (1.63), we can easily observe that
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d
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+
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@La

which means that lim!1  dRcad > 0 if
dh
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< lim!1 
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: Finally, if we focus on the
evolution of !c, its total derivative can be proved to be positive provided that  > 1=2 and
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1.6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Since Ln and Ls are invariant in our model, from Lemma 1 we can infer that dRnsd < 0
i¤ dd < 0:
The easiest way to compute dd is by considering expressions (1.35) and (1.37). Let
D(Lc; Ln) =

Ln + a

g
m+ g

(1.66)
From (1.24), (1.29), (1.37) and (1.73),  = wn
h
Ln + a
h
  1(2 1)

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  Lna
ii
; and by taking
logs and di¤erentiating
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It is easy to show that, precisely,
dD
d
1
D
=
am
 
dLa
d

am 2 (Ln   ag) (1.68)
and therefore, by (1.58), (1.61), (1.67) and (1.68),
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(2 1)Q
2
i
(1 +Q)
< 0 (1.69)
Apart from the assumptions of this proposition, expressions (1.41) and (1.69) ensure that
lim!1 
d
d < 0:
1.6.6 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let nk =
nk
nn
and ck =
ck
nc
be the proportion of eastern and western equity, respec-
tively, owned by a representative household living in location k, where nk and ck are the
absolute measures of western and eastern rms owned by that household. Then, the amount
of gross savings for any household living in k can be expressed as follows:
(Gross Savings)k = GSk = wk + ckncc + nknnn   Ek (1.70)
We know that in our steady state
_jk
jk
=
_jk
jk
  g = 0; i.e. _jkjk = g 8j = West, core;8k = West,
core, periphery. Therefore,
_nk
nk
=
GSkfnk
vnnk
 m =
_ck
ck
=
GSk (1  fnk)
vcck
= g (1.71)
where fnk is the proportion of total gross savings devoted to the purchase of western equity.
Then, from (1.71),(1:4) and (1.28), we can easily solve for GSk:
GSk = (m+ g)nka

g
m+ g

wn + gckamwc (1.72)
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On the other hand, it is easy to see from (1.4) and (1.25) that the instantaneous variation in
the value of previously-owned assets, considering also the e¤ect of imitation, is the following:
@Vk
@t
=   (m+ g) nka

g
m+ g

wn   gckamwc
where Vk is the value of previously-owned assets by a household in location k. Since, by (1:72)
and the last equation; (Net Savings)k=GSk+
@Vk
@t = 0 8t in any steady state, any households
wealth is kept constant along the balanced growth path, i.e.
yk = Ek = wk + ckamwc + nka

g
m+ g

wn (1.73)
where yk is household ks income, 8k = West, Core, Periphery in steady state.
1.6.7 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. From (1.33) we can check that
lim
!1 
 > 1=2 i¤ (1  ) < lim
!1 

wn

Ln + a

g
m+ g

  wc (Lc + am)

(1.74)
As we can conclude after inspecting expressions (1.24), (1.29), (1.35) and (1.36), condition
lim!1   > 1=2 can only be satised i¤ (1.74) holds. Now we just have to look for a su¢ cient
condition that guarantees (1.74). From our denition of Q in expression (1.34), condition (1.74)
can be restated as follows:
(1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i
  (1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i :  (Lc + am)
Ln   ag
2 1
< P2 (1.75)
By the assumptions established in this lemma, necessarily P2 > 0: Lets now dene the function
H(Lc; Ln) =
(1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i
  (1  )
h
Lc
am
  Lna
i :  (Lc + am)
Ln   ag
2 1
  P2 (1.76)
It is easy to see that @H@Lc  0 and @H@Ln  0 8Lc; Ln: Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for (1.74)
follows from any situation in which H(Lc; Ln) < 0: We want to search for a relation between
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the initial values of Lc and Ln that ensures that H(Ls; Ln) < 0 and hence that lim!1   > 1=2
. For any initial value of Lc that satises (1.24) and (1.30), we can determine that, from (1.76),
H(Lc;
aLc
am
) =  P2 < 0 and H(Lc; a

Lc
am
  
1  

) > 0 (1.77)
Since the equality H(Lc; Ln) = 0 contains an implicit function L^n(Lc) for which @Ln@Ls =
  @Q=@Ls@Q=@Ln > 0 8Lc; Ln; then L^n (Lc) is an increasing function in Lc: Since H(Ls; Ln) is a
monotone and continuous function in Ln; from (1.77) we can apply Bolzanos theorem to state
that
9 a unique function L^n(Lc) such that H(Lc; L^n(Lc)) = 0 8Lc (1.78)
Finally, from the sign of the partial derivatives above, we can say with certainty that 8Lc; if
Ln > L^n(Lc) then H(Lc; Ln) < 0; which means that Q < P and hence that lim!1   > 1=2:
1.6.8 Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. From (1.11) we can express the wide-gap assumption when  ! 1  as

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)Lcam + 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
 (Lc + am)
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35  2 (1.79)
Rearranging and rewriting (1.79) with an equality, we get the following quadratic equation in
Lc : 
Lc
am
  Ln
a

=

(1 ) 
1 +

Ln a (1 )am +a


2 
1  (Lc+am)
! (1.80)
Since, from condition (1.30), Lc > 0 and Ln > aamLc  
a
(1 ) ; we can conclude that the denom-
inator of the right-hand side of (1.80) is bigger than 1. This means that at least one root Lc1of
(1.80) satises for sure the inequality amLna < L

c1 < am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
; because the right-hand
side is positive and smaller than 1  : Now we have to make sure that L

c1is a unique root within
the interval (amLna ; am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
):
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If we formally restate (1.79) we can obtain the following inequality:
Z(Lc) = EL
2
c + FLc +G  0 (1.81)
where
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am
2 
1    a(1  )
a2m
(1.82)
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1
1  am
2

We can see that, in principle, the signs of E and F are undetermined but that of G is clearly
negative, which implies that Z(0) < 0. Lets explore now the implications of the 2 possibilities
concerning the sign of E:
-If E > 0 then, since Z(0) < 0 , Z(Lc) is necessarily a quadratic function with one positive
and one negative root. Therefore, we know for sure that there is a unique Lc1 such that
Z(Lc1) = 0 and am
Ln
a < L

c1 < am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
: Given that this curve cuts the horizontal axis
from below, conditions (1.81) and (1.30) will be satised.
-If E < 0; Z(Lc) will be now a concave function with at least one positive root Lc1, but
in principle it could have another one within our particular interval
h
am
Ln
a ; am
h
Ln
a +

1 
ii
:
In order to reject this latter possibility, it will be enough to show that Z(amLna ) < 0 and
Z(am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
) > 0;which would imply that the other root is out of our interval.
It is possible to check that
Z
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
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2+2
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+ 

< 0
Z(am

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
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2  1
2

Ln
 22 + 2  2 > 0
Again, since this curve intersects the horizontal axis from below, if E < 0 the wide-gap case is
compatible with positive measures of manufactures in both countries i¤ amLna < Lc  Lc <
am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
:
To summarize, if  ! 1  , 8am and a, 8 2 (0; 1) ;9 a unique Lc such that both (1.11)
and (1.30) hold i¤ amLna < Lc  Lc < am
h
Ln
a +

1 
i
; where Lc is the smallest positive root
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of equation (1.80).
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Chapter 2
Skill-Upgrading and the Saving of
Immigrants
Summary 2 This note derives positive implications about the e¤ect of immigration on labor
income and the skill composition of the labor force in receiving economies. The novel mechanism
through which immigration a¤ects labor-market outcomes is the availability of new loanable
funds for human-capital investment, which results in endogenous skill upgrading. Given their
higher training costs in the host economy, immigrants usually do not acquire advanced academic
skills, and they accordingly skip the nancial costs of education at the college level. As a result,
they self-select as net lenders, which reduces the equilibrium interest rates and facilitates the
upgrading mostly of new generations of natives. Consequently, the aggregate labor income of
natives increases with immigration.
2.1 Introduction
Both legal and illegal immigration from LDCs conform a reality acquiring unprecedented di-
mensions today in many developed countries. Accordingly, there has been a substantial deal
of controversy as to whether the average native worker gains or loses from the new migratory
ows. Two recent empirical exercises that obtain quite opposite conclusions are Borjas (2003)
and Ottaviano and Peri (2006). The main reason why the second of these papers estimates a
net average gain, unlike the rst one, is the multiplicity of channels by which immigrants a¤ect
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labor market outcomes. Apart from the downward pressure on native wages, Ottaviano and
Peris structural model allows for a consideration of between-worker complementarity and the
entry of new rms in response to higher protability.
Our purpose in this paper is exploring an alternative channel by which the immigration
surplus could be enlarged. Unskilled immigrants are often accused of draining funds from the
welfare systems of recipient countries, while they contribute very little with direct taxes given
their low upgrading prospects. Here we explore a novel mechanism by which they could o¤set
- at least partially - that e¤ect as net suppliers of loanable funds. We show how immigrants
- even when they are permanent - face cultural barriers that increase their training costs; this
fact makes them work during most of their life-cycle, without a formal acquisition of academic
training at the college level. Moreover, after skipping these academic nancial costs, an altruistic
motive leads them to carry their savings forward into the future in order to bequeath to their
children, which raises the amount of loanable funds available in the nancial system. This
increase in loanable funds lowers interest rates, thus providing young cohorts of natives with
savings to nance their educational expenses. These favorable nancial conditions lower the
ability requirement for those who try to become skilled, who are mostly native, which raises
the skill composition in the host economy.
In order to make our results as sharp as possible, we explore the limit case in which the
(labor-market) complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor is totally switched o¤. In
spite of that, we nd that an immigration surplus continues to exist, even if both labor categories
are perfectly substitutable. Therefore, although wages hardly vary with immigration, the skill-
upgrading of natives leads to an immigration surplus. This result runs counter to Borjas
(1994)s statement that an immigration surplus arises only when native wages fall as a result
of immigration.
We want to emphasize that - given their higher training costs and the intergenerational
persistence of that situation - certain ethnic groups of immigrants are likely to remain stuck in
their relative position of inferiority with respect to earnings and upgrading. However, precisely
because of that stickiness - and since they will probably work during most of their life cycle
- they can provide natives with better wage prospects, even in the absence of wage-premium
rises due to skill complementarities. Therefore, the frequent complaint about the relatively
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poor performance of some immigrants in the labor market may not always be justied, since
the main reason for their relative economic backwardness - i.e. their higher training costs - is
also the key to some nativesgain from immigration.
2.2 Related Literature
2.2.1 Theoretical Contributions
There is a long history of attempts to account for the dynamics of the economic performance
of immigrants relative to natives. Along the whole series of theoretical and empirical e¤orts
to understand the issue, there has been a common interest in the savings rate, frequently
considered the key to migrantscapacity to accumulate wealth and increasingly approach the
economic performance of the native-born. Initially, migrants apparent success to approach
- and even eventually outperform - their native counterparts was justied with self-selection
arguments: the migratory decision was only undertaken by a very specic range of the foreign-
born population, and therefore the human-capital and demographic characteristics of migrants
and natives were not homogeneous.
However, in the late 80s Djajic (1989) and Galor and Stark (1990) inaugurated a line of
research by which incentives in the host country - as opposed to a self-selection derived from
the migratory decision - were highlighted as the reason for the higher local saving-rates of
immigrants relative to otherwise identical natives. The di¤erential incentives faced by migrants
came for a certain probability of return migration: they saved more than natives because lower
future wages in the home country increased their future marginal utility of wealth, and the
extra precautionary savings were useful for them to outperform comparable native-born.
The main novelty of our approach is that it applies even to permanent residents in the host
country who will never intend to return. That is, a higher savings propensity does not need
to hinge on a probability of return migration and an earnings di¤erential between the home
and the host country. In this sense, Cornelius (1990) reports that the maturation of social
networks of unskilled migrants in the US is making of permanent migration a prevalent phe-
nomenon: " the shift from a migrant population consisting mainly of highly-mobile, seasonally
employed lone males, towards a more socially heterogeneous, year-round, de facto permanent
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Mexican immigrant population in California accelerated in the 1980s". This tendency adds
some relevance to the potential channel we identify.
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence
Concerning the empirical literature, a few old pieces of evidence seemed to capture the regular-
ities we mentioned above about migrantssavings propensity. For example, Jones and Smith
(1970) reported that the local (i.e. net of remittances) savings rate of migrant workers in Great
Britain in 1975 was about 2% above the UK average. For France, the average local savings of
foreign workers in 1970 was 50% higher than those of a French person with the same income
(Granier and Marciano (1975)). Further evidence from this period is also collected in MacMillen
(1982).
Nevertheless, the previous articles provide only a weak support to our argument, since they
are based on data from countries where higher education is heavily subsidized by the public
sector, and therefore where our basic mechanism can hardly hold. That is the reason why we
have turned to the evidence from the US, where it is a common practice to apply for loans to
nance educational expenses and repay those loans once the applicant owns a steady job. Our
major relevant ndings about the US reality can be summarized as follows:
- a) According to the 2001-2002 Current Population Survey (CPS), the workforce participa-
tion by male undocumented migrants reaches 96%, whereas only 84% of comparable native-born
US citizens are members of the labor force.
- b) Immigrants conform 11% of total US population, 14% of all workers, 20% of low-
wage workers and 39% of low-skilled workers. These numbers seem to roughly validate our
assumption about higher training costs for migrants, and to conrm our outcome about their
self-selection as low-skilled workers.
- c) Is there any evidence in support of their crucial role as net lenders in the US? Concerning
this issue, we have resorted to the econometric results obtained by Carroll, Rhee and Rhee
(1999). These authors use household data from the 1980 and 1990 Census of Population and
Housing in the US to test whether the saving patterns of immigrants are signicantly di¤erent
across the country of origin, and also whether those patterns match up with the saving patterns
of their home countries. They also test whether there is a general "immigration e¤ect" at the
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time of entry, taken to mean the e¤ect on saving that is common to all immigrants, regardless
of their origin and the duration of their stay in the US.
Interestingly, they nd that "all immigrants have higher saving rates than natives", and the
"immigration e¤ect" on the savings rate is positive and signicant. But that is not the end of
the story: if their basic motivation to save so much was a possibility of return migration - as
in Galor and Stark (1990) or Stark (2006)s models - they should have found that assimilation
completely eliminates the extra savings. But, however, for many countries the estimates show
no sign of assimilation in savings behavior. Even for those countries which have those signs of
assimilation, "it takes 27 to 62 years to close a 5 percent saving rate gap".
Moreover, Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999) also report that "immigrants from Greece, Italy
and Portugal had the highest savings rate, over twenty percent of income annually." And,
precisely, it is noticeable that people from those countries in the sample are mostly blue-
collar workers (producers and labor workers) often with only elementary educational attainment
(47.5% for Greece, 67% for Italy and 74.6% for Portugal, respectively). We believe that there
must be an underlying economic rationale behind the saving behavior of those ethnic groups
and its impact on the host economy, and we have tried to shed some light on these issues.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Assumptions and general description
Immigrants are assumed to stay permanently in the host economy. They enter the host country
(at the beginning of their life) without previously-accumulated human capital, and - for sim-
plicity - the higher training costs are intergenerationally permanent, in such a way that there
is no di¤erence between newly-arrived immigrants and their children with respect to upgrading
probabilities.1
We portray a receiving country whose production function combines skilled (Ns) and un-
skilled industrial workers (Nu) in a perfectly-competitive environment. For simplicity, we have
abstracted from the use of physical capital. Individuals supply a unit of labor inelastically
1Alternatively, we could make every generation of immigrants become identical to natives in their second
period of life, but allow for a continuous ow of immigrants in every period. Under this alternative setup, we
would not expect results to change substantially.
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and there is no disutility from e¤ort. The production function faced by any productive unit is
specied as follows:
y = (N "u + N
"
s )
1
" (2.1)
where  > 1 is an indicator of technology bias towards skilled labor. Traditional models of
immigration surplus have focused on labor-market complementarities derived from a limited
degree of substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor (0 < " < 1); this resulted in a
net gain for the native population once unskilled wages fell and the subsequent surplus was
appropriated by skilled labor (or capital). In contrast to these explanations - and in order to
sharpen our point - here we will focus on a pure capital-market complementarity in which both
types of labor are perfect substitutes and - consequently - their respective wages are not altered
by immigration (since " = 1). We will show how, even in that case, skill-upgrading is able to
induce a rise in the aggregate labor income of natives.
As a result of perfect competition - and given (2.1) and our assumption on perfect substi-
tutability (" = 1) - the skill-premium is given by
! =
ws
wu
=  (2.2)
In our model, which is based on Galor and Zeira (1993), individuals live for two periods. In the
rst one they must decide whether to acquire skills by investing in academic training - using
the parental human-capital bequest - or to work as unskilled; in the second period they work
according to their skills, consume, have a child, decide upon the childs home education and
(potentially) leave a human-capital bequest.
Our particular assumption is that parents do not bequeath physical or nancial capital in
period two, but they can hire some qualied professors to teach their child at home and reduce
his/her future training costs (at the university) in case he/she was to become skilled.2 More
specically, if the child is capable enough, parents nance x hours of home teaching. Such a
human-capital transfer will reduce their childs needed number of hours in college by the amount
2Altruism and bequests are not strictly necessary to make our point. Nevertheless, they are convenient to
justify immigrantsdecision not only to work from the beginning, but also to postpone consumption and save.
An alternative would be introducing a reason to save endogenously during the rst period of life, by means - for
example - of a cost of rearing children during the second period.
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ax, where a is a measure of the idiosyncratic ability of the child to prot from home-education.
We adopt the assumption of risk-neutrality of preferences and warm-glow altruism, in the
form of parental interest in the future income enjoyed by the child. The assumption on risk
neutrality is a strong one, because in that way the optimal human-capital bequest (x) is in-
dependent of parental wealth. Nevertheless, we are not interested in the dynamics of income
inequality, but in a simple comparative-statics exercise between two steady states with a di¤er-
ent proportion of migrants in the population of the host country. Under risk neutrality, there
will be a unique steady state, which will facilitate our work. Let us consider the following utility
function, expressed in expected terms:
Ut = ct + EtWt+1 (2.3)
where ct stands for consumption (during adulthood) and EtWt+1 for the expected income
accruing to the next generation. On the other hand,  is an indicator of parental altruism
towards future generations.
During his/her educational process, any individual must hire a quantity  of skilled pro-
fessors at the university, though his own ability combined with the human capital bequest
allows him to reduce that upgrading cost. Every professor works for one period. When de-
ciding whether to upgrade skills in period one or not, young individuals make the following
comparison:
(2 + r) ? (1  (   ax)(1 + r)) (2.4)
where  is a measure of the training costs, which depend on the skilled wage - as in Rigolini
(2004) - because only skilled teachers can train the unskilled labor force.The term ax represents
the amount of training that the individual can skip due to the familial transmission of human
capital (x) and his/her idiosyncratic ability (a).
Unskilled individuals are supposed to work in both periods and save the initial earnings
for the second one, since they only consume (and bequeath) in period two. The skilled ones
borrow from the unskilled to pay for their training costs in the rst period, and then repay their
debt once they receive the skilled wage in the second period. Consequently, from (2.4), a young
native individual will decide to upgrade skills i¤
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a > 1
x

 +

(2 + r)  
 (1 + r)

 a (2.5)
whereas a similar expression a0 holds for immigrants provided that we replace  by 0  :
Our assumption is that parents observe the realization of the childs ability and decide upon
leaving a human-capital bequest (or not) on the basis of that realization. From (2.5), they know
that the child will upgrade i¤ x  a , where
(r) =  +

(2 + r)  
 (1 + r)

(2.6)
and a is the observed realization of the ability random variable. Therefore, following (2.3),
parents will compare the current costs and future benets of providing a bequest, which are
shown in the following inequality:
 
a
+  (   (2 + r)) ? 0
For simplicity, we have assumed that parents derive utility from their childs gross earnings,
before their debts have been repaid. This implies that parents will bequeath exactly what
their child needs to become a skilled worker, and never more. If the previous inequality is
non-negative, it will be worth for them to leave a bequest due the high gross earnings of the
o¤spring. This will happen only if the ability realization is high enough, i.e. there will be a
bequest provided that
a    2 + r   (1  (1 + r))
 (   (2 + r)) (1 + r) (2.7)
Therefore, it is the boundary-value for the parent () the only relevant cuto¤ for the decision-
making. It is easy to check that @@r> 0. Let us denote by 
0 the relevant cuto¤ value for
immigrants, who only di¤er from natives because 0>: We also assume that a is a random
variable that follows a general distribution function F (a), with support on a 2 [0;1); such that
F 0(a)  0 8a.
The labor force in the model can be native or immigrant. We assume that the amount
of native population is normalized to 1, whereas a measure M of immigrants are already in
the economy during the rst period considered. The only distinction between any native and
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immigrant employee is the cost parameter 0> , which is higher for immigrants because of the
need to learn the language and similar cultural barriers.
Where do teachers come from in this economy? Since they are skilled employees, they must
get the same wage as the skilled industrial workers, i.e. all members of the skilled labor force
must be indi¤erent between teaching or working for the industry. Furthermore, there must be
exactly the right amount of teachers to train next periods labor force. Therefore, if we denote
the measure of teachers at time t by  t and the measure of skilled industrial workers at time t
by N st , then  t = (N
s
t+1 +  t+1):Hence, in steady state,
N s = (1  ) (N s + )
2.3.2 Existence and uniqueness of a steady-state competitive equilibrium
If we now consider an endogenous interest rate r, we can obtain the conditions required
for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state competitive equilibrium in this economy.
This equilibrium can be dened as a positive interest rate and a subsequent allocation of
immigrants and natives across the skilled and unskilled occupations, such that the supply of
credit by the unskilled is identical to the demand by skilled industrial workers and teachers. It
is straightforward to derive that the relevant equilibrium condition in steady state is
F () +MF (0) = 

(   ) 1  F ()) +M  0   0)(1  F (0) (2.8)
where on the left-hand side we have the supply of loanable funds by the unskilled, and on the
right-hand side we can observe the aggregate expenditure on training. Taking expressions (2.6)
and (2.8) into account, the previous expression boils down to the following equality:
   (2 + r)
1 + r
 
1  F () +M(1  F (0) = F () +MF (0) (2.9)
Studying carefully the previous equality gives rise to the following proposition on the conditions
for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 If (1  0)  2; then there exists a unique steady-state competitive equilibrium
characterized by a positive interest rate r 2 (0;    2) ; with positive measures of the native and
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immigrant population both in the borrowing and the lending side of the credit market.
Proof. From expression (2.9) it is straightforward, after rearranging, to come up with the
following equation of the aggregate excess demand for credit:
Z(r) =
1
1 + r

(   (2 + r)) (1 +M)  (   1)  F () +MF (0)) (2.10)
where we have denoted by Z(r) the di¤erence between the aggregate demand and the aggregate
supply of credit. From (2.7) we can observe that the value of r that makes 0 = 0 is
r
¯
=
   2  0
1 + 0
(2.11)
i.e. r
¯
is the value of the interest rate that shuts down the supply of credit. On the other hand,
the value of r that shuts down the demand for credit is precisely
r =    2 (2.12)
Now we have to prove that our equilibrium interest rate lies between both values and is also
unique. It is easy to show that Z(r
¯
) = ( 1)
0
1+0 > 0 and also Z(r) =   (   1) (1 + M) <
0: Moreover, a thorough inspection reveals that Z(r) is a continuous, di¤erentiable, strictly
decreasing function for all values of r. This implies, using Bolzanos theorem, that - if r
¯
 0; i.e.
if (1  0)  2 - then there exists a unique competitive equilibrium interest rate r 2 (0;    2)
such that Z(r) = 0: Furthermore, (r) > 0(r) > 0; which involves that there are positive
measures of the native and immigrant population on both sides of the credit market.
The previous proposition spells out the requirement of a relatively advantageous skilled
occupation (in terms of both the skill premium and training costs) for the existence of an active
demand side of the credit market. At the same time, that condition guarantees that the supply
side will be active as well, since market clearing ensures that one side of the market will not
shut down while the other is active. Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate is shown to be
unique, which facilitates our task of predicting the e¤ects of immigration.
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2.3.3 The availability of loanable funds
Now we are ready to derive our desired e¤ect of immigration on the availability of loanable
funds. This happens because, in this setting, loans are supplied by unskilled workers who
receive income from their rst period of life - though they can not consume until the second
period - and they are demanded by the skilled labor force to nance their individual training
expenses. Migration provides a higher proportion of unskilled people who supply funds, which
reduces r and also the cuto¤ values of  and 0 needed to access high-wage jobs. For the new
supply of immigrants to provide a net supply of funds, they need to face higher training costs in
order to enlarge the pool of lenders more than the pool of borrowers. As a result, it is possible
to obtain an immigration surplus that does not depend on variations in the wage premium.
Proposition 4 Provided that " is close enough to 1 (perfect substitutability between unskilled
and skilled labor) and 0 > , then ddM < 0;
d0
dM < 0;
dr
dM < 0 and the aggregate labor income of
natives increases with immigration.3
Proof. From (2.9) we can di¤erentiate and solve for drdM to obtain that
dr
dM
=
(   (2 + r))  (   1)F (0)
MF 0(0)d0dr + F 0()
d
dr + (1 +M)
 (2.13)
Furthermore, we know from (2.9) that    (2 + r) = ( 1)(F (0)M+F ())1+M : By plugging the latter
expression into (2.13), we nally get
dr
dM
=
(   1) (F ()  F (0))
(1 +M)

MF 0(0)d0dr + F
0()ddr + (1 +M)
 (2.14)
We know from (2.7) that ddr ;
d0
dr > 0 and hence the denominator of the last expression is
positive. For (2.14) to be negative we also need the numerator to be smaller than zero, which
requires 0 > . This last inequality holds i¤
0 > 
3By aggregate labor income of natives we understand the sum of the remunerations to both skilled and unskilled
labor.
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Then, ddM =
d
dr
dr
dM < 0: Since wages are invariant - by perfect substitutability - and  >
(2 + r) > 1; the aggregate labor income of natives increases.
Additionally, we can make some inferences about the welfare implications of immigration
for di¤erent goups of natives. All generations of natives can be ex-ante better-o¤ if the skill
premium is high enough. Indeed, we know that
EtWt+1 =  [(1  F ()) + (2 + r)F ()] =  [   F () (   (2 + r))]
Since immigration reduces the interest rate, there are 2 opposite e¤ects of immigration on the
expected income of the o¤spring: on the one hand, it is easier for them to upgrade and get
the higher wage, but if they do not, they will receive lower interest-rate payments. After some
algebra, it is possible to come up with a neat conclusion about dEtWt+1dM :
dEtWt+1
dM
> 0 i¤ (   1) d
dr
F 0() (shareu) > 1 (2.15)
where shareu =
F (0)M+F ()
1+M is the share of unskilled population over the total. Expression
(2.15) means that the expected income of the o¤spring will rise if (and only if) the ability
cuto¤ is substantially lowered, many people take advantage of it and the skill premium is
substantial enough.
2.4 Conclusions
This note establishes a formal link between the relative training costs of migrants and their
working and saving behavior, with an immediate implication with respect to the skills of natives
future generations. One of the innovative aspects of this work is the absence of any reference to
return migration as a key to understanding the saving behavior of immigrants. Another one is
the way we disregard any complementarity between productive factors, in order to di¤erentiate
our argument from traditional models of immigration surplus.
As a conclusion, we can emphasize that the reason for the usual complaint about the rela-
tively poor performance of immigrants in the labor market may work as a blessing under the
right circumstances, since the cause of their (relative) economic backwardness - i.e. their higher
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training costs - is also the key to some natives gain from immigration. Another intriguing
implication is the fact that, even in the case of perfect substitutability between skilled and
unskilled labor, natives can always be better-o¤ in real terms provided that the skill premium
is high enough.
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Chapter 3
Trade and Migration: a U-shaped
Transition in Eastern Europe
Summary 5 This paper proposes a 2-country 3-region economic geography model that can ac-
count for the most salient stylized facts experienced by Eastern European transition economies
during the 1990s. In contrast to the existing literature, which has favored technological expla-
nations, trade liberalization and factor mobility are the only driving forces. The model correctly
predicts that in the rst half of the decade trade liberalization led to divergence in GDP per
capita, both between the West and the East and within the East. Consistent with the data,
in the second half of the decade, internal labor mobility in the East reversed this process and
convergence became the dominant force. The model furthermore shows that the same U-shaped
pattern applies to relative industrialization of West and East, although within the East the
hinterland continued to lose industry throughout the decade.
3.1 Introduction
The decade of the 1990s in Eastern European transition economies has been characterized by a
U-shaped pattern of relative development. Initially, relative income per capita between Western
and Eastern Europe diverged, and from the middle of the decade onward, this pattern reversed,
and Eastern Europe started to catch up with its Western counterpart. When analyzing the
relative performance of di¤erent Eastern European countries, a similar pattern emerges. The
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countries closest to the West initially experienced faster growth than the Hinterland, but in the
second half of the decade that pattern also reversed.
The literature has typically explained these U-shaped patterns by relying on technological
arguments or on the misallocation of factors of production. Boldrin and Canova (2003), for ex-
ample, suggest that technological obsolescence led to an initial period of intense unemployment
and reallocations after trade was liberalized. Blanchard (1996) and Blanchard and Kremer
(1997) link the initial slump to microeconomic disorganization. The collapse of the state
sector was precipitated by traditional input suppliers, who found attractive opportunities out-
side the state sector and broke the established productive chains.1 Cociuba (2006) and Keller
(1997) also stress the role played by technology adoption to account for the GDP trajectories
of Eastern European countries. The existing literature thus puts the emphasis on the intensity
of reallocations that were needed to adapt to a superior Western technology, followed by a re-
markable catch-up process that was conditioned (and sometimes threatened) by redistributive
public policies.
While we do not claim these explanations are erroneous in any way, in this paper we delib-
erately disregard issues of technological backwardness or sectoral misallocations. Instead, we
propose an economic geography model, where trade liberalization and factor mobility are the
only driving forces. The model consists of 2 countries (West and East) and three regions (one
region in West, and a Border and Hinterland in the East). To make the results as sharp as
possible, West and East have identical technologies and endowments. Agriculture is perfectly
competitive, and industry is monopolistically competitive. Although workers are perfectly mo-
bile between sectors, there is no labor mobility between East and West. As for labor mobility
within the East, part of the policy experiment consists in understanding how the migratory
liberalization between Border and Hinterland a¤ects relative economic performance. Trade in
industrial goods is subject to transport costs, which are higher between Hinterland and West
than between Border and West. As in Krugman and Venables (1995), industrial rms use
intermediate goods, which gives rise to forward and backward linkages.
1According to Blanchard and Kremer (1997), international trade was - if at all - benecial to stabilize those
economies, since it provided them with abundant new input suppliers, capable of replacing the previously de-
stroyed economic relationships. Here our paper suggests that an immediate exposure to international trade might
have been damaging to CEE countries in the short run.
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This simple setup, which abstracts from technology and endowment di¤erences, is su¢ cient
to account for the main stylized facts. Before describing the results in some more detail, we need
to be more specic about the timing and the extent of the two driving forces, trade liberalization
and factor mobility. The focus of our analysis is the decade of the 1990s. The European Union
had already liberalized much of trade with Eastern Europe in the very early 90s. Later in the
decade, labor mobility within Eastern Europe, which traditionally had been virtually illegal,
was liberalized. We can therefore conclude that trade liberalization predated migration within
the East. One could of course wonder why we do not analyze labor mobility between East and
West as well. However, with the exception of ethnic Germans, migration between East and
West only took o¤ in earnest at the turn of the century, so it cannot account for the reversal
in the U-shaped pattern around the middle of the decade.
The rst result is that trade liberalization between West and East leads to divergence in
GDP per capita, both between West and East and between Border and Hinterland. The positive
performance of West can be explained by a Home-Market e¤ect. As trade costs drop, rms shift
towards the larger market. This same phenomenon gives rise to the relative deindustrialization
of East in favor of West. Proximity to the larger market has benets though, given the crucial
access to the bulk of consumption goods and intermediate inputs. This explains the divergence
between Border and Hinterland, in favor of the region closest to the West.
The second result is that the introduction of labor mobility within East leads to convergence
in GDP per capita, not just between Border and Hinterland (which is obvious), but also between
West and East. As soon as migrations are allowed, population moves from Hinterland to
Border. This allows for a stronger Home-Market e¤ect in East. As a result, Border attracts
new rms,2and income per capita in East starts to catch up with that of West. Within East,
income di¤erences between Border and Hinterland go down, but in terms of industrialization,
Border continues to gain relative to Hinterland.
It is important to realize that trade liberalization alone would not be able to account for
the upward part of the U-shaped pattern between West and East and between Border and
2Although in our model there is no capital, we can assimilate the ow of rms from West to Border - following
the migratory reform - with the abundant FDI received by eastern countries. That FDI experienced a substantial
acceleration in the second half of the decade: according to the EBRD, 85% of the FDI received by the area came
after 1993 (see Marinov (2003)).
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Hinterland3. Allowing for labor mobility is therefore what drives the revival of East. However,
it is su¢ cient for labor mobility to be introduced within East for income per capita to converge
between East and West. Of course, permitting labor mobility between East and West would
only reinforce our results.
Our model can be viewed of a generalization of Krugman and Venables (1995). They showed
how in a 2-region model the early stages of trade liberalization could bring about lower real
wages and deindustrialization in smaller markets. The di¤erence with our 3-region model is
that we can analyze both the relative performance of East and West and Border and Hinterland.
In other words, we can say something about the internal geography of East. This approach has
other potential applications. For example, one may be interested in understanding how trade
liberalization a¤ects the internal geography of China. To address this issue, clearly a 3-region
model, such as the one we propose, is needed.4
Our work is also related to Puga and Venables (1997), with the qualication that we explore
asymmetric country sizes. That practice is also undertaken by Forslid (2004), although his
model does not permit the study of labor mobility, and the absence of vertical linkages prevents
a detailed welfare analysis. Finally, Venables (2000) presents a similar three-location framework
as we do, but he focuses on the internal geography of a developing country that is hardly
industrialized for intermediate levels of trade costs. Our starting point is di¤erent: for all levels
of trade costs, both West and East are industrialized.5
To the best of our knowledge, there are very few papers dealing explicitly with trade liber-
alization and the internal geography and welfare of Eastern European countries. One of them
is Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2002). They extend Krugman (1991) by including a third
3 It is true that, in a setting with two symmetric countries, Puga (1999) predicts that trade alone would
generate a nal East-West convergence stage. Nevertheless, the existence of an internal trade barrier within
the East gives rise to an asymmetry in the size of the markets, which prevents convergence unless migration
is introduced. In any case, we can understand the introduction of free migration as a way to accelerate the
upcoming of convergence (both East-West and Border-Hinterland) as trade barriers melt away.
4Another interesting point is exploring the normative implications of free internal labor mobility. Unfor-
tunately, our conclusions - though interesting - are very dependent on our parameterization and di¢ cult to
generalize.
5Brakman and Garretsen (1993) and Ross (2001) are two interesting applications of economic-geography
models to the understanding of internal disparities in the unied Germany. Nevertheless, they do not introduce
a third location (the larger EU) as a signicant element to explain those evolutions. They just portray a lowering
of internal trade barriers between both German regions. Their models - as Krugman (1991) and Forslid and
Ottaviano (1999) - , link the mass of manufacturing varieties to the stock of mobile labor, which prevents a study
of global industrialization / deindustrialization.
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location (the EU) and allowing for a di¤erential regional access to the EU market within the
CEECs. They analyze in depth the di¤erent forces shaping the prevalence of the Border over
the Hinterland, although their model cannot study deindustrialization at the national level, and
does not reproduce the external and internal patterns of convergence.
Another paper of interest is Damijan and Kostevc (2002), who study the role played by FDI
to accelerate the arrival of an interregional-convergence stage within Eastern Europe. The role
played by FDI in their model resembles the one played here by internal migration. Nevertheless,
in their setting the Hinterland - understood as the region where the state capital locates - is
larger than the Border and benets from the absorption of manufacturing activity in the early
stages of trade openness. That is just the opposite to what Crozet and Koenig (2002) and our
model predict.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stylized facts we aim
to explain, and justies the main assumptions underlying our policy experiment. Section 3
presents the analytical framework. Section 4 uses numerical experiments to study the e¤ect of
trade liberalization and migration. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Policy changes and stylized facts
3.2.1 Policy changes
We start by discussing the two main policy changes we focus on: increased trade openness
betweenWest and East, and internal labor mobility within East. Justifying their relative timing,
with trade liberalization predating labor mobility, is important for our policy experiments.
East-West trade liberalization
The route towards East-West trade liberalization started quite early in countries like Yugoslavia
or Romania. In particular, the European Community signed an initial Generalized System of
Preferences with Romania in 1974, and an agreement on manufacturing trade was reached
in 1980. However, the most comprehensive Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) were
approved by the EU and individual CEE countries at the beginning of the 1990s, from 1990
to 1992. The EU granted GSP status rst to Hungary and Poland (1990), then to Bulgaria
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and former Czechoslovakia (1991), and subsequently to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1992).
In short, "the features found in the trading pattern of CEECs suggest that the export share
towards EU-15 was, in the rst half of the 1990s, relatively high partly because reduction in
trade barriers had already taken place." (De Benedictis, De Santis and Vicarelli (2005)).
Migratory liberalization within East, but not between East and West
According to Kaczmarczyk and Okolski (2005), during the communist era migration in Eastern
Europe was negligible. This does not only apply to migration between countries, but also within
countries. Rural-to-urban mobility was also greatly delayed and generally low. In contrast to
Western European nations, in many Eastern countries the process of industrialization took
place in the absence of massive urbanization.
It was during the 1990s when substantial policy reforms were enacted to liberalize labor
ows across Eastern European countries. For example, in 1993 the Czech Republic established
a liberal migration policy which turned the country into the home to tens of thousands of
migrants from Europe and Asia during the decade (Drbohlav, 2005). In 1993 Russia abolished
the internal passport and allowed for freedom of movement (Heleniak, 2002).
To understand the magnitude of the phenomenon, in 1989 fewer than 3 million visitors
entered Poland from the Soviet Union, but their number more than doubled the next year and
continued to grow to more than 14 million in the peak year 1997. Although these numbers talk
about visitors, a survey conducted in Ukraine and Poland in 1995 suggests that many of the
so-called visitors worked illegally during their stays in Poland, mostly as petty traders. They
were encouraged by the economic crisis in the former Soviet Union, and by the easy access to
Eastern Europe.
This last point is important. The results of a survey on the borders of Poland with Belarus,
Ukraine and Russia reveal that Poland was not perceived by respondents to be the destination
country, but rather as a good place to learn about migration, before inltrating the grey
economic zones of Western Europe. According to Iglicka (2001a), migration from Russia stopped
in Poland, because of the much more di¢ cult access to Western European countries. Iglicka
(2001b) argued that
Migration pressure from the East induced by the collapse of the system, combined with the
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restrictive migration policy of Western Europe towards former USSR countries, were conducive
to the formation of the Central European bu¤er zone. Poland is probably the best example of a
bu¤er zone country.6
The only exception to restricted migration between East and West concerns ethnic Germans.
Between 1989 and 1999 an estimated 678,000 ethnic Germans moved to the homeland. Although
there were non-ethnic German foreign nationals moving, their net migration experienced a sharp
decline around 1992, to the extent that net migration in the mid nineties was close to zero.
Of course by the turn of the century this situation changed, and migratory ows between
East and West increased signicantly. However, our papers focus is limited to the 1990s. For
that particular decade, assuming labor mobility within the East, but no labor mobility between
East and West seems adequate.
3.2.2 Main stylized facts
We now give an overview of the main stylized facts we aim to account for in our theoretical
model.
U-shaped pattern of relative income per capita between East and West.
Figure 1 shows income per capita of East relative to West.7 As can be seen divergence in the
rst half of the decade was followed by a slight convergence starting around the middle of the
decade.
U-shaped pattern of relative income per capita within East
A similar U-shaped pattern shows up when analyzing the income per capita of Hinterland
relative to Border. This can be seen in Figure 2, where we consider the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia as the Border, and the rest of Eastern countries included in our
previous footnote as the Hinterland.
6Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary will be an example of a Border country in the model we will present
later.
7Data come from the Groningen Growth and Development Center. West has been dened as EU-15, and East
as Albania, Armenia, Azerbajan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.
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Figure 3-1: U-shaped pattern of East-West relative development.
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Figure 3-2: U-shaped pattern of Hinterland-Border relative development.
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Figure 3-3: Ratio East / West manufacturing output
Pattern of industrialization between East and West
In Figure 3 we plot the ratio of Eastern to Western manufacturing production during the
period 1992-2000. The reason why the U-shaped pattern is broken in the last 2 years of the
decade is the negative impact of the 1999 nancial crisis on the Eastern manufacturing outcome,
which obscures the relative recovery that was taking place since 1995.8
Continued deindustrialization of Hinterland
Since we have manufacturing data just for a couple of Hinterland countries, we provide
below (in Figure 4) the joint evolution the share of manufacturing output for Romania and
Estonia.
8Data are collected from the wiiw Industrial Database for Eastern Europe (Wien) and the Groningen Growth
and Development Center. We include the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as the Border, whereas we only
have access to Romania and Estonia as the Hinterland.
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Figure 3-4: Continuous deindustrialization of Hinterland.
3.3 The model
Consider a model with two countries (West and East) and three regions (one region in West, and
Border and Hinterland in East). The three regions are denoted by W (West), B (Border) and
H (Hinterland). There are two sectors, agriculture and industry, and two factors of production,
labor and land. Both countries have identical technologies and endowments, though West is
better integrated due to the absence of internal trade costs. In practice, this turns West into
a larger market. The regions of East are equally large in terms of land. Whereas labor is
immobile between East and West, it may or may not be mobile within East. Part of our policy
experiment consists in understanding how the introduction of migratory ows between Border
and Hinterland a¤ects relative economic performance.
Trade in industrial goods is subject to transport costs, which are higher between Hinterland
and West than between Border and West, because there are trade costs between Border and
Hinterland. The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive, and uses land and labor as its
inputs. Since the supply of land is xed, the agricultural sector faces decreasing returns to
labor. This entails agriculture endogenously takes place in all locations. The industrial sector
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is monopolistically competitive. As in Krugman and Venables (1995), industrial rms use
labor and intermediate goods, which gives rise to forward and backward linkages. The detailed
description of the model in the following subsections is similar to Puga (1999).
3.3.1 Endowments
To make our results as sharp as possible, there is no role for traditional comparative advantage
sources. The goal is to understand whether simple forces of economic geography can account
for the stylized facts of Eastern European transition economies. That is, countries and regions
do not di¤er in their access to technology or relative endowments of labor and land, but just
in their locational advantage. That advantage is itself endogenous, and linked to the interplay
of international and interregional trade costs, as the former decrease over time.
In particular, let us denote by Ki and mi the stocks of land and labor in location i, respec-
tively. The former is an invariable parameter of the model, whereas the latter will end up being
endogenous, once we allow for labor mobility between Border and Hinterland within the East.
In particular, we will set KH = KB = 1=2; KW = mW = 1; mH +mB = 1:
3.3.2 Industry
Trade in manufactures is subject to iceberg transport costs. Between West and Border, for
one unit to arrive, B units should be shipped, where B>1. The internal trade cost between
Border and Hinterland is T, where T>1. Between West and Hinterland, Border plays the role
of a portthrough which all goods need to be shipped. This implies that trade cost between
West and Hinterland, H , must be equal to BT .
The industrial sector is monopolistically competitive. There is a continuum of manufactur-
ing varieties whose available mass in each location is an endogenous variable. Following Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977), production of a quantity x(k) of any variety k requires the same xed ()
and variable (x(k)) quantities of the production input in any location. This combined with
symmetry and increasing returns ensures that in equilibrium no variety is produced by more
than one rm in more than one country.
The production input in manufacturing is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor and an ag-
gregate of intermediates. Following Ethier (1982), all industrial goods enter symmetrically into
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the intermediate aggregate, with a constant elasticity of substitution across varieties (>1).
The price index of the aggregate industrial composite used by rms is region specic, and in
the case of location B it is dened by
qB =
Z
hnB
p1 B (h)dh+
Z
h0nW
p1 w (h
0) 1 B dh
0 +
Z
h00nH
p1 H (h
0
) T 1 dh
0
 1
1 
(3.1)
where pi represents the price of a locally-produced manufacturing variety in region i. We have
also denoted by ni the available mass of manufacturing varieties produced in region i. (The
price indices of the other regions can be dened by analogy). Now that we have determined the
price of the intermediate composite, we can write down the cost function of a manufacturing
rm h located in region i that produces output xi (h):
Cih = (+ xi(h))q

i w
1 
i (3.2)
where wi stands for the local wage in region i, and  (0    1) is the share of intermediates
in rmscosts (an indicator of the strength of vertical linkages).
3.3.3 Agriculture
Agriculture is perfectly competitive. It produces a homogeneous good - which plays the role
of numeraire (pAi = 18i) -, using labor and land with a constant returns to scale technology
described by the production function yi = g(LAi ;Ki). Ki is the stock of arable land available in
location i and LAi denotes agricultural employment. In our particular case - as in Puga (1999)
- , function g will be a Cobb-Douglas production function: g(LAi ;Ki) = L
A
i
 K1 i : Therefore,
from the landownersprot maximization we can obtain the following demand for agricultural
labor:
LAi = Ki


wi
 1
1 
(3.3)
We incorporate a system of public landownership: once agricultural rents have been collected,
they are perfectly taxed away and rebated to the local workers in a lump sum fashion.9
9Since in many of these countries land was privatized during the second half of the decade, we have allowed
in some experiments for a land-privatization reform in parallel with the migratory reform. To that purpose,
we assumed that - after that reform - land rents belonged entirely to agricultural workers, whose total income
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Let us denote by mi the total population living in location i, and by Ri the per-capita
agricultural rents rebated to every local worker living in i. In particular, using (3.3) and the
agricultural production function, it is easy to show that
Ri =

(1  )Ki


wi
 
1 

mi
(3.4)
3.3.4 Preferences
Turning to the demand side, consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the agricultural
good and a CES composite of industrial goods, with industrial expenditure share  (0    1) :
For simplicity, all industrial varieties produced are assumed to enter consumersutility function
with the same constant elasticity of substitution with which they enter rmstechnology. This
generates the following indirect utility function for workers living in location i:
Vi = q
 
i Yi (3.5)
where Yi stands for the income of a representative worker in location i. That income consists
of labor earnings and the rural and urban rents rebated proportionally to the local population.
3.3.5 Residential Sector
We follow Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) and introduce commuting costs internal to each
region. This provides a source of congestion, which prevents the full agglomeration of all Eastern
manufactures in the Border region. In each of the three locations, we assume the existence of
a Central Business District (CBD) to which the local population must commute in order to
supply their amount of e¤ective labor. That population is distributed along a segment centered
at the CBD, and every worker must allocate inelastically a unit of time between e¤ective labor
and commuting10. As can be expected, those commuting costs will be higher the further away
(agricultural wage plus land rents) was kept identical to the urban wage. As a result, the qualitative results of
our simulations were not di¤erent from those presented below.
10For simplicity, we assume that both farmers and manufacturing workers need to commute to the CBD. That
is believed to be innocuous for our main qualitative conclusions.
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every commuter is from the CBD. In particular, a commuter living at a distance z from the
CBD will supply 1   2z units of time to the labor market, where  is the parameter that
measures the strength of commuting costs.
Consequently, the local stock of e¤ective labor in i will be
Li = 2
mi
2Z
0
(1  2z) dz = mi (1  (mi=2)) (3.6)
where mi denotes the size of the population living in location i. Since the distribution of
population across CEE regions turns out to be endogenous, we will consider that mB+mH = 1
in the case of perfect labor-mobility within the East. In the case of perfect labor-mobility
restrictions, we will exogenously set mB = mH = 1=2:
Moreover, the extra income that a worker can gain by living closer to the CBD will be
exactly compensated by higher rent costs paid to the landowners, in such a way that all local
workers enjoy the same utility level. This implies that the real urban rent RU (z) to be paid by
a worker living in location i can be derived as follows:
RUi (z) = wi(1  2z)  wi(1  mi) = wi(mi   2z) (3.7)
Since all urban rents are collected and proportionally rebated to the local population, we need
to compute the magnitude of the urban rebate, which - from (3.7), will be equal to
Urban Rebate =
2
mi
2Z
0
RUi (z) dz
mi
= wi
mi
2

Therefore, adding up labor income and rural and urban rebates, nominal income
Yi = wi(1  
mi
2

) +Ri (3.8)
3.3.6 Labor Mobility
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There is no labor mobility between West and East, but there may be labor mobility between
Border and Hinterland. As is standard in the literature, migration is assumed to be myopic,
acting only in response to current real-income di¤erentials. Labor mobility has the e¤ect of
eliminating those real-income di¤erences, net of commuting costs, between Border and Hinter-
land:
YBq
 
B = YH q
 
H (3.9)
3.3.7 General Equilibrium
Individual demands coming from workers, all of which share the same elasticity of substitution
, are calculated by using Roys identity on expression (3.5) and summed in each region.
Demands coming from individual rms, which also share the same elasticity of substitution, are
calculated by using Shephard´s lemma and summed in each region. As a result, total demand
for a rm in region i producing variety h, xi(h);is
xi(h) =
X
jfB;H;Wg
(pi(h))
 ej q 1j T
1 
ij (3.10)
where Tij is the indicator of transport costs from i to j, and ei is the total expenditure on
manufactures in region i:
ei = 

wimi(1  
mi
2

) +miRi

+ 
Z
h2ni
C(h) dh (3.11)
The rst term in expression (3.11) is the value of consumer expenditure, since consumers spend
a fraction  of their income on manufactures, where consumer income is the sum of labor
income and the rebate of urban and agricultural rents. The nal term is intermediate demand,
generated as rms spend fraction  of their costs on manufactures.
Di¤erentiating demand with respect to a rms own price - after substituting expressions
(3.1), (3.2) and (3.11) into (3.10) - shows that every rm faces a constant price elasticity
 in every region. All rms producing in any particular region then have the same prot -
maximizing producer price, which is a constant relative mark-up over marginal cost:
pi =

   1q

i w
1 
i = q

i w
1 
i (3.12)
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where we have applied the normalization  1 = 1.
Even though rms set a unique price for their output regardless of whether it is sold do-
mestically or exported, the consumer price paid per unit received is either T , B or TB times
higher in the region where the good has to be imported. The prots of each manufacturing
rm in region B are, from expressions (3.2) and (3.12),
B =
1

h
q
(1 )
B w
(1 )(1 )
B
 
q 1B eB + q
 1
H eH+ q
 1
W eWI
  qBw1 B i
or, equivalently,
i =
pi

(xi   1) (3.13)
where  = T 1 ;I = 1 B and we have applied the normalization  =
1
 :This means that
xi = 1 (3.14)
is the unique level of output giving rms zero prots.
On the other hand, given (3.1) and (3.12), the price-index equation for region B can be
written implicitly as follows:
q1 B =

qBw
1 
B
1 
nB +

qHw
1 
H
1 
nH+

qWw
1 
W
1 
nwI (3.15)
and the same can be done with qH and qW .
Turning to the labor market, from (3.2) and (3.3), the labor-market clearing condition can
be written as
(1  )C(h)i
wi
ni +Ki


wi
 1
1 
= Li = mi (1  (mi=2)) (3.16)
The rst term in the left-hand side of (3.16) is labor demand in manufacturing, obtained by
application of Shephard´s lemma to (3.2). The second term stands for the agricultural demand
for labor, which is given by expression (3.3). If we add up both terms, the sum must be equal
to the available supply of e¤ective labor, given by (3.6).
Now we are ready to give a formal denition of a Steady State associated with a given level
of B:
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Denition 6 A Steady State associated with a given B is a vector of prices and allocations
fpi;; wi; qi; xi; Ri; Yi; Ci;mB; ei; ni; i 2 fB;H;Wgg that satises
1. Equation (3.1): qB =
hR
hnB
p1 B (h)dh+
R
h0nW p
1 
w (h
0) 1 B dh
0 +
R
h00nH p
1 
H (h
0
) T 1 dh0
i 1
1 
(Denition of price-index of local intermediate composite)
2. Equation (3.12): pi = q

i w
1 
i (Prot Maximization by manufacturing rms)
3. Equation (3.10): xi(h) =
P
jfB;H;Wg(pi(h))
 ej q 1j T
1 
ij (Utility maximization by
consumers and cost minimization by rms; the market of every manufacturing variety clears).
4. Equation (3.11): ei = 
 
wimi(1  
 
mi
2

) +miRi

+ 
R
h2ni C(h) dh (Aggregation of
consumer and rm expenditure on manufactures).
5. Equation (3.4): Ri =
 
(1 )Ki


wi
 
1 
!
mi
(Prot maximization in agriculture).
6. Equation (3.2): Cih = ( + xi(h))q

i w
1 
i (Denition of the cost function for every
variety).
7. Equation (3.16): (1   )C(h)iwi ni +Ki


wi
 1
1 
= mi (1   (mi=2)) (Local labor market
clearing).
8. (xi   1)ni = 0, xi  1; ni  0:(Free entry / zero-prot condition for local manufacturing
rms).
9. Equation (3.8): Yi = wi(1  
 
mi
2

) +Ri (Denition of nominal income).
10. Equation (3.9): YBq
 
B = YH q
 
H (Determination of relative labor supply in Border and
Hinterland when labor mobility is allowed; otherwise, the relevant equation is mB = 1=2).
The rst nine conditions above are linked to three equations, one for each location; whereas
condition 10 is only expressed by equation (3.9). Therefore, computing a steady state for every
value of B is a static problem with 28 equations and 28 unknowns.
It is useful to think of short-run prots as being related to the number of rms in each region
by four forces: product and labor-market competition, and cost and demand linkages. A larger
number of rms producing in the same region increases demand for labor, leading to higher wage
costs - expression (3.16). Product market competition is also tougher in regions where more
varieties are produced locally; if more varieties are available locally instead of being imported
subject to trade costs then the price index of industrial goods is lower - expression (3.1) -so,
for a given price and level of expenditure, local demand for each industrial good is smaller -
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expression (3.10). Product and labor market competition tend to make rms located in markets
with relatively many rms less protable, encouraging exit and leading to the geographical
dispersion of industry. Therefore, these two forces are sometimes called "neoclassical".
Pulling in the opposite direction there are cost and demand linkages. Cost linkages come
from the lower prices that rms and consumers have to pay for manufactures in regions where
there are relatively many rms - expressions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.5). Demand linkages arise
as an increase in the number of demand rms and / or workers raises local expenditure on
manufactures - expression (3.11). Cost and demand linkages tend to increase the short-run
protability of rms in regions with a large number of rms, and they lead to entry. When they
are strong enough they can overturn product and labor-market competition, thereby making
dispersed outcomes unstable and triggering industrial agglomeration.
In the long run, prots must be zero wherever there is a positive measure of rms, and
there must be no rms wherever prots are negative. That adjustment takes place increasing
the number of rms if prots are positive and decreasing it (for potential, if not for actual,
rms) whenever they are negative.
3.4 Numerical Simulations
The goal of this section is to analyze the e¤ect of trade liberalization and labor mobility on
development, industrialization and population density. We conduct two di¤erent experiments.
In both of them we look at the e¤ects of a gradual decrease in international trade costs (B),
while keeping a xed value of internal trade costs (T ) between Border and Hinterland. In the
rst experiment there is no labor mobility of any kind, neither between East and West nor
between Border and Hinterland. In the second experiment, trade liberalization is followed by
the introduction of labor mobility within the East, between Border and Hinterland.
Our choice of parameter values will be identical to Puga and Venables (1997)s with respect
to  = 0:55;  = 0:5; and  = 0:8. However, we selected  = 3 instead of  = 4 in order
to t better the observables11. On the other hand, we had to assign some values to the new
11We can justify that our models parameterization falls in the ballpark of what is reasonable. For example,
the value of  can be induced from the average markup in the industry. A value of  = 3 corresponds to a
markup of 50%; Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2006) recently estimated for the EU a value of  around
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parameters in our model:  = 0:85;  = 0:05; KH = KB = 1=2; KW = mW = 1; mH+mB = 1:
The degree of internal trade openness between Border and Hinterland () is, by assumption,
always bigger or equal than the degree of international trade freeness (I).
Our simulations do not intend to capture the whole set of stable steady-states at any level
of international trade costs: we just obtain a stable steady-state for the initial value of trade
costs, and as trade openness rises we make the economy follow the transitional dynamics: we
increase (decrease) the local mass of varieties where prots are positive (negative), until the
free-entry condition is satised. As a result, we obtain a sequence of steady states as trade
costs decay.12
3.4.1 Trade Liberalization without Labor Mobility
We can observe our results for the fully-restricted-labor-mobility case in gures 5 and 6, where
the horizontal axis in each panel shows the level of international trade costs (B), assumed to
be bigger or equal to T = 1; 08.
We must emphasize that - at least under our parameterization - the revival of East relative to
West, and of Hinterland relative to Border, does not take place in the absence of internal labor
mobility. Initially, trade liberalization involves tougher competition for both Eastern locations,
whereas the larger Western market is hardly a¤ected by the scant Eastern competitors. This
leads to a process of international (East-West) divergence (see gure 4).
Nevertheless, openness to the large market not only implies tougher competition, but also
higher exports and cheaper imports of intermediates for the East, specially for the Border. That
proximity to the largest market is crucial for the Border to absorb most of the manufacturing
share of the Hinterland, which reduces the standards of living in the latter location and leads
to a process of interregional divergence (see gure 5). Both characteristics seem to correspond
roughly to the initial years of the transition period, when we know that migrations within East
2.96. The value of  can be also inferred from the Input-Output tables of the Czech economy, where in 1995 the
ratio of intermediate inputs to total output in current prices was around 0.62, although this value varies greatly
across industries. The value of , if we consider food and housing as our primary goods, amounted to a 46.8%
of household expenditure during 2000 in Umbria (Italy) (see Papalia (2006)).
12 In a separate experiment, we have also tried to introduce the whole trade reform all at once, followed by a
transition. Finally, once the steady state was reached, we incorporated the migratory reform. The results were
not qualitatively di¤erent from those we will present next.
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Figure 3-5: Ratio real wage East / West without labor mobility.
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Figure 3-6: Ratio real-wage Hinterland/Border without labor mobility.
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were still subject to signicant restrictions.
3.4.2 Trade Liberalization and Labor Mobility within East
Since trade liberalization does not lead to any kind of recovery, we know see whether migration
within the East had any e¤ect. The evidence tells us that internal migration (within the East)
started in earnest some time in the mid 1990s, whereas migration from East to West did not
really take o¤ until the present decade. We therefore focus on liberalization of migration within
the East.
We have checked that, by introducing the migratory reform in the midst of the trade lib-
eralization process - as we think it took place in the real world- we are able to replicate more
closely our stylized facts, reected on gures 1-3. To that purpose, we have tentatively chosen
a level of B = 1:49 as the particular point where migrations within the East are fully allowed
(the date we have in mind could be around 1993). We can observe in Figure 7 that, immediately
after the migratory liberalization is enacted, an important contingent of population ows from
Hinterland to Border in response to higher real income (net of congestion costs). This higher
degree of population concentration within the East enlarges the home-market of this country
and attracts a higher world share of manufacturing varieties, in such a way that international
real-wage levels start to converge (see Figure 8).
We want to emphasize that - even in the context of asymmetric countries13- we get conver-
gence between East and West without assuming labor mobility between East and West. It is
true that Krugman and Venables (1995) and Puga (1999) also obtained that result, but they
did it in a context of symmetric countries in which market size was evenly distributed. Once
the eastern market is assumed to be smaller (due to internal trade costs), trade liberalization
alone is unable to lead to a recovery, and the eastern population needs to be more concentrated
in order to attract rms towards the Border. Of course, if one were to introduce East-West
migration this would reinforce our results.
If we plot the average real wages of East and West (and Border and Hinterland within the
East), we obtain two U-shaped curves very similar to Figures 1 and 2. It is noticeable that the
13The asymmetry in the size of the markets of East and West is derived from the internal trade cost (T )
introduced within the eastern country.
77
% of pop. In Border
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2,5
8
2,2
3 2
1,8
2
1,6
9
1,5
8
1,4
9
1,4
1
1,3
4
1,2
9
1,2
4
1,1
9
1,1
5
1,1
1
1,0
8
Level of International Trade Costs
%
 o
f E
as
te
rn
 p
op
ul
at
io
n 
in
B
or
de
r
Figure 3-7: Migratory ow towards Border
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Figure 3-9: Patterns of relative industrialization.
policy shock triggers an international convergence trend that is reinforced by the last stages of
trade openness, once lower labor costs nally induce rms to relocate towards the East. The
same policy reform is responsible for the relative improvement of the living standards in the
Hinterland relative to the Border, given that the labor-supply e¤ect outweighs the home-market
gain in the Border and the deterioration in the Hinterland.
It is easily observable that our simulations nd an amazing recovery, whereas in our empirical
evidence the upward part of the U-shape is much atter. It would be interesting to see what
would happen if we assumed that migration is costly. That may account for the gradual recovery
of the East relative to the West and the Hinterland relative to the Border.
The evolution of local manufacturing shares under labor mobility can be observed in Figure
9, where we can observe how - though real wages in the Hinterland recover in relative terms
- the Hinterland continues losing industry throughout the decade, which conforms with our
stylized facts (see Figure 4).
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3.4.3 Some Normative Implications
Nevertheless, the migratory liberalization has also a di¤erent, unexpected e¤ect on real wages.
Since almost the whole manufacturing sector gets concentrated in West and Border, there is
no longer need to trade in intermediates with Hinterland. Therefore, internal transport costs
within the East are mostly skipped, which allows rms to quote lower prices and provide higher
real wages everywhere. That is the sense in which internal labor mobility turns out to be
Pareto-improving for an appropriate parameterization. To see this, compare Figure 10, which
plots real wages when there is labor mobility in the East, to Figure 11, which plots real wages
when there is no labor mobility.
This happens because, in essence, the migration has a double e¤ect on Western indirect
utility: on the one hand, the West loses part of its manufacturing share in favor of the Border,
which reduces the e¤ectiveness of vertical linkages; on the other hand, the Hinterland is left
out of the game, which reduces trade costs and increases that e¤ectiveness. Therefore, the
model can help us understand the forces at stake, though we can not make denite predictions
about local welfare14, since they will always be very dependent on our parameterization.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined some mechanisms - exclusively related to economic geography,
trade openness and freedom to migrate - as possible ingredients to account for the recent
real-income prole of CEE countries. We have deliberately disregarded any interference of
technological di¤erences across regions or unrelated public-policy factors. As a result, the
belated incorporation of freer international trade and new labor mobility emerge as candidates
to explain the evolution of both external and internal disparities.
Initially, a higher trade openness generates a ow of productive capacity from the East
towards the largest market (the West), and also from the Hinterland to the Border, where foreign
inputs are much cheaper. As a result, the early stages of trade liberalization are characterized
by both international (East-West) and interregional (within the East) divergence. Later, it is
14Those predictions would always depend on our particular choice of parameter values. For instance, our choice
of  looks specially relevant for the convenience of agglomeration in a single location.
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internal (Hinterland-Border) migration which drives both the revival of the East with respect
to the West and the recovery of the Hinterland with respect to the Border (in terms of real
wages), though subsequently the Hinterland deindustrializes.
A di¤erent normative implication points at internal labor mobility as a potentially Pareto-
improving measure, at least in a context where labor-force heterogeneity, assimilation costs,...
do not play a major role. The reason for such a welfare gain is a concentration of the productive
chain within a highly integrated area (the West and the Border), which allows saving trade costs
and spurs global industrialization.
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